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AVOIDING ANOTHER PROPOSITION 13: THE
NEED FOR REFORM OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA PROPERTY TAX
CHARLES H. MERCER, JR.t
DONALD R. WHITTAKERt
One of the most hotly debated issues in property tax circles is
whether a system of fractional assessment or full value assessment
should be used to value realproperty. North Carolina law requires that
property be appraised atfair market value, but in practice the law is
often ignoredinfavor of a defacto system offractional assessment, with
valuation practices differing signiftcantly from county to county in the
State. As California's experience with Proposition 13 indicates, taxpay-
ers will not long tolerate a property tax system that is overburdensome
and inequitably applied In this Article Messrs. Mercer and Whittaker,
recognizing the potential that exists in this State for taxpayer revolt,
carefully examine the North Carolina property tax. The authors first
trace the constitutional and statutory requirements of the currentprop-
erty tax law and then evaluate the actual practices ofproperty tax as-
sessors against those standards. They conclude that the current law is
not being followed and argue that it needs reform. After examining
reform that has occurred in other states, the authorspropose model leg-
islation that adopts a system offull value assessment, supplemented by a
roll-backprovision to temper the effects of inflation on tax assessments.
This system, the authors believe, is necessary to avoid the kind of tax-
payer unrest in this state that other states have experienced
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of whether fractional assessment or full value assessment
should be used as a standard for the valuation of real property has been de-
bated vigorously for the last twenty years. This debate has led to legislative
action in some jurisdictions and judicially mandated reform in others.
The North Carolina Constitution mandates that the taxing power be exer-
cised in a "just and equitable" manner.' Certain statutory provisions require
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property to be appraised at fair market value.2 Evidence in court actions and
county records, however, indicates that the state's constitutional and statutory
provisions frequently are ignored in the actual practice of valuing real prop-
erty. In fact, hearings before the North Carolina Property Tax Commission
indicate that the current valuation and assessment practices soon may be chal-
lenged in either state or federal court.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the current property valuation
system in North Carolina. It will address whether the statutorily mandated
valuation system is being followed, whether a successful challenge to the sys-
tem in either state or federal court could occur, and whether the statutorily
mandated fair market valuation system is indeed an appropriate system. Fi-
nally, the article will propose model legislation that might help correct the
valuation problem in North Carolina and thus prevent a challenge in the
courts.
To most North Carolinians it is not a question, but a fact, that the prop-
erty tax law needs to be revised. In fact, the former city-county supervisor of
Mecklenburg County has warned that the octennial 1983 property revaluation
could trigger a tax revolt in that county. Because of sky-rocketing property
values, taxes have also increased, prompting Mr. Alexander to state that
"[p]roperty taxes have gone about as far as the public will stand for it. ' '3 Al-
though a tax revolt is brewing in Mecklenburg County, one already has oc-
curred in Burke County following that county's octennial revaluation. At one
public meeting the county commissioners locked themselves in a room to es-
cape an angry crowd, and another commissioner had his necktie cut in half by
an angry citizen.4 Although these incidents are rare, tax dissent tends to brew
in any county in which a revaluation is underway or was recently completed,
and according to Jean Sales of Asheville, President of United Taxpayers, a
group seeking to limit the property tax, tax revolt groups have sprung up in at
least a dozen western countries.5
As North Carolina heads down this uncertain path, legislative reform
seems a viable alternative to revolt. It is apparent that the octennial valuations
are not functioning as well as they did in the years when revaluation was a
tour about the muddy country roads on an old steed and during an era when
inflation did not double property values every half dozen years. Conse-
quently, North Carolina's Machinery Act, the property tax legislation, needs a
fast, complete, yet viable reform before taxpayer morale, citizen suits, and re-
volt make any reform action impossible.
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-283 (1979). The actual statutory language is "true value in
money," the term "'true value"' [being] interpreted as meaning market value."
3. The Charlotte News, Feb. 18, 1980, at IA, col. 1.




II. THE PROPERTY TAX LAW OF NORTH CAROLINA.
A. Constitutional Requirements
The guidelines for the taxation of real property in North Carolina are
found in one section of the North Carolina Constitution and in the North
Carolina General Statutes. In addition, a federal statute circumscribes the
power of the legislature in its taxation of railroad property. The North Caro-
lina Constitution in article V, section 2, subparts (i) and (ii), provides:
Sec. 2. State and local taxation.
(1) Power of taxation. The power of taxation shall be exercised
in a just and equitable manner ....
(2) Classfication. Only the General Assembly shall have the
power to classify property for taxation, which power shall be exer-
cised on a State-wide basis. No class shall be taxed except by a uni-
form rule, and every classification shall be made by general law
uniformly applicable in every county, city and town, and other local
taxing unit of the State. The General Assembly's power to classify
property shall not be delegated.
6
The Constitution requires that the state and local governments exercise
the power of taxation in a just manner and that taxes be uniformly applied
throughout the state. The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the
meaning of uniformity under article V, § 3 of the 1868 Constitution7 in Hajoca
Corp. v. Clayton.8 In Hajoca Corp. a plumbing fixture corporation challenged
a North Carolina sales and use tax that provided for a referendum by the
voters of each North Carolina county to decide whether to impose the sales
and use tax on businesses within the county.9 The effect of the tax was that a
business located within a county that passed the tax had to pay a one percent
sales and use tax on sales within that particular county as well as on sales in all
other counties in North Carolina.10 However, a business in a nontaxing
county was not required to pay the tax in any North Carolina county.I1 Bun-
combe County, which was plaintiffs principal place of business, as well as 24
other counties, passed the local option tax, while 75 other counties voted it
down.12 Plaintiff corporation then paid a total of $1,170.14 in sales and use
taxes. Buncombe County collected $436.41 of this total for sales and deliveries
made by the plaintiff corporation in counties that voted down the tax.13
6. N.C. CONsT. art. V, § 2(i) & (ii).
7. N.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 3 (1868) provided:
Laws shall be passed taxin&, by a uniform rule, all moneys, credits, investments in bonds,
stocks, joint-stock companies or otherwise; and, also, all real and personal property ac-
cording to its true value in money. The General Assembly may also tax trades, profes-
sion franchises, and incomes, provided that no income shall be taxed when the property,
from which the income is derived, is taxed.
8. 277 N.C. 560, 178 S.E.2d 481 (1971).
9. Id at 561-62, 178 S.E.2d at 482.
10. Id at 562, 178 S.E.2d at 483.
11. .Id at 561, 178 S.E.2d at 482.
12. Id at 563, 178 S.E.2d at 483.
13. Id at 561, 178 S.E.2d at 482.
19811
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In determining whether this tax was constitutional, the court examined
authorities on the issue of uniformity. In defining uniformity in taxation, the
court drew from a number of sources.
Equality within the class or for those of like station and condition is
all that is required to meet the test of constitutionality. . . . 'A tax
on trades, etc., must be considered uniform when it is equal upon all
persons belonging to the prescribed class upon which it is imposed.'
* . . It may also be noted that the requirements of 'uniformity,'
'equal protection,' and 'due process' are, for all practical purposes,
the same under both the State and Federal Constitutions.' 4
The court concluded' 5 with a quotation: "The principles of equality and uni-
formity are indispensable to taxation, whether general or local. Local taxation
must be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of
the authority levying the tax, and must be assessed upon all the property ac-
cording to its just valuation."' 16
The court held that Buncombe County had illegally and unconstitution-
ally exacted the tax from the plaintiff corporation and ordered a refund of the
$1,170.14. The court found that the tax was not uniform because it required
the plaintiff corporation to pay the tax on its sales throughout the state, while a
competitor of the plaintiff located in a nontaxing county did not have to pay
the tax anywhere in the state.
17
A second case interpreting the uniformity provisions of article V, section
2, is In re Martin.'8 In Martin the Supreme Court cited Hajoca Corp. for the
proposition that the Constitution requires "uniformity in taxation [that] relates
to equality in the burden on the State's taxpayers."' 9 The Martin court then
14. Leonard v. Maxwell, 216 N.C. 89, 3 S.E.2d 316, quotedin 277 N.C. at 568, 178 S.E.2d at
486.
15. Before concluding its list of sources, the court quoted Norfolk S. R.R. v. Lacy, 187 N.C.
615, 122 S.E. 763 (1924). The court also noted the following authorities in its definition of uni-
formity within a territory:
"Uniformity of taxation, as provided for by state constitution, is required through-
out the territorial limits of the taxing district * ." Cooley on Taxation, 4th Ed., p.
645.
"Taxing is required to be by a uniform rule-that is, by one and the same unvarying
standard. Uniformity in taxing implies equality in the burden of taxation, and this
equality of burden cannot exist without uniformity in the mode of assessment, as well as
in the rate of taxation. But this is not all. The uniformity must be co-extensive with the
territory to which it applies. If a State tax, it must be uniform all over the State. If a
county or city tax, it must be uniform throughout the extent of the territory to which it is
applicable .. " Burroughs on Taxation, Section 51, p. 62.
277 N.C. at 569, 178 S.E.2d at 487.
16. Id at 569, 178 S.E.2d at 487 (quoting 2 DEsTY ON TAXATiON 1119 (1884)).
17. Id at 570-71, 178 S.E.2d at 488. In a dissent joined by two other justices, Chief Justice
Bobbitt agreed with the majority that the $436.41 of taxes collected on sales outside of Buncombe
County was properly refundable to the plaintiff corporation. The Chief Justice, noting the separa-
bility clause in the statute, would allow a North Carolina county to impose a tax on sales made
within that particular county by a business located in that county; however, no taxes could be
collected on a transaction outside the jurisdictional limits of the taxing county. Thus, the dissent-
ingjustices believed Buncombe County could validly collect the $733.73 in taxes imposed on sales
made within the county. Id at 571-73, 178 S.E.2d at 488-89.
18. 286 N.C. 66, 209 S.E.2d 766 (1974).
19. Id at 76, 209 S.E.2d at 773. The Martin court decided that goods which were stored by a
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delineated the bounds of uniformity:
Article V, Section 2 of the Constitution of North Carolina pro-
vides, inter alia, that the General Assembly alone has the power to
classify property for taxation and that no class shall be taxed except
by a unform rule. Even so, this constitutional provision does not
prohibit reasonable flexibility and variety appropriate to reasonable
schemes of State taxation. . . While the General Assembly may
not establish a classification that is arbitrary or capricious, a classifi-
cation is constitutional if founded upon a reasonable distinction or
difference and bears a substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion.
20
Thus, the power of the General Assembly to classify property for taxa-
tion, as provided for by article V, section 2(2), has been construed broadly.
The legislature's power to classify subjects for taxing purposes is flexible, and
the power carries with it the discretion to select subjects to be so classified.2 1 A
classification will be upheld by the court if it is not arbitrary or capricious and
is based on reasonable differences between the delineated classes.22 Any clas-
sification must apply equally to all members of the class defined.
2 3
B. Statutory Requirements
In addition to the broad constitutional provisions, specific statutes govern
the taxation of real property. These statutes, N.C. Gen. Stats. 105-283, 105-
284, and 105-317(1), are particularly relevant to any discussion of valuation of
real property for the purpose of taxation. Section 105-283 of the North Caro-
lina General Statutes provides:
Unform appraisal standards.-All property, real and personal,
shall as far as practicable be appraised or valued at its true value in
money. When used in this subchapter, the words "true value" shall
be interpreted as meaning market value, that is, the price estimated
in terms of money at which the property would change hands be-
tween a willing and financially able buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having
foreign corporation in warehouses in Mecklenburg County were being held for "transshipment"
as that term is used in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-281 (1969) (repealed 1973) and thus were exempt
from ad valorem taxation. The court also held that Mecklenburg County did not have standing to
challenge the nontaxable classification of property. First, the County, as a creature of the General
Assembly with no inherent taxing power, cannot complain that its enabling legislation is lacking
in breadth. 286 N.C. at 74,209 S.E.2d at 772. Second, the County could not accept the benefits of
the statute's taxing powers and then turn around and contest on constitutional grounds the statu-
tory classification of property that was exempt from property taxes. Id at 74-75, 209 S.E.2d at
772. Finally, the County may not challenge the constitutionality of the legislation since it is not a
member of the class subject to the alleged discrimination and there was someone else with stand-
ing to assert the alleged constitutional deficiency. Id at 75, 209 S.E.2d at 772-73. The court,
although denying standing to the County to attack the constitutionality of the statute, did allow
the County to challenge the interpretation of the statute. Id at 76-77, 209 S.E.2d at 773.
20. 286 N.C. at 75-76, 209 S.E.2d at 773 (Martin court's emphasis) (citing Ohio Oil Co. v.
Conway, 281 U.S 146 (1930)).
21. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shaw, 232 N.C. 307, 59 S.E.2d 819 (1950).
22. Snyder v. Maxwell, 217 N.C. 617, 9 S.E.2d 19 (1940).
23. Id
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reasonable knowledge of all the uses to which the property is adapted
and for which it is capable of being used.
24
Section 105-284 requires a uniform assessment standard:
All property, real and personal, shall be assessed for taxation at
the valuation established under G.S. 105-283, and taxes levied by all
counties and municipalities shall be levied uniformly on assessments
determined as provided in this section.
25
Section 105-317(a) states:
(a) Whenever any real property is appraised it shall be the duty of
the persons making appraisals:
(1) In determining the true value of land, to consider as to each
tract, parcel, or lot separately listed at least its advantages and disad-
vantages as to location; zoning; quality of soil; waterpower; water
fertility; adaptability for agricultural, timber-producing, commercial,
industrial, or other uses; past income; probable future income; and
any other factors that may affect its value except growing crops of a
seasonal or annual nature.
(2) In determining the true value of a building or other im-
provement, to consider at least its location; type of construction; age;
replacement costs; adaptability for other uses; past income; probable
future income; and any other factors that may affect its value.
(3) To appraise partially completed buildings in accordance
with the degree of completion of January 1.26
Although Section 105-283 expressly defines "true value," the North Caro-
lina courts still have developed their own interpretation of the words. The
North Carolina Supreme Court has asserted that the purpose of the section "is
to assure, as far as practicable, a distribution of the burden of taxation in pro-
portion to the true values of the respective taxpayers' property holdings,
whether they be rural or urban."27 The court also stated that "[t]rue value
...means the amount for which such property can be sold in the usual man-
ner of sale."'28 Further articulation of this theme is found in other cases.
"True value" has been equated with "actual market or fair cash value," 29 but
"true value" does not necessarily mean "book value." °30 In appraising prop-
erty there does not have to be a market for a piece of property to have a true
value: "[m]arket value can be constructed of elements other than sales in the
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-283 (1979).
25. Id § 105-284.
26. Id Section 105-317(1) is important primarily because it reinforces the legislative intent
of § 105-283 and § 105-284. The court, in In re Reeves Broadcasting Corp., 273 N.C. 571, 160
S.E.2d 728 (1968), found that § 105-295, the predecessor of the current § 105-317, was directory;
however, "all real property as far as practicable, [should] be appraised at its true market value in
money." Id at 578, 160 S.E.2d at 733.
27. In re King, 281 N.C. 533, 539, 189 S.E.2d 158, 161 (1972).
28. Id
29. Albermarle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Alexander, 282 N.C. 402,408, 192 S.E.2d 811,816
(1972).
30. See In re Amp. Inc., 287 N.C. 547, 564, 215 S.E.2d 752, 763 (1975).
[Vol. 59
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market place." 3 1 In their determination of true value, appraisers should con-
sider all the factors that enter into market value.32 "There may be reasonable




Congress has enacted legislation that affects the property tax system by
prohibiting discrimination against railroad transportation property in the as-
sessment and levying of property taxes. A railroad challenging the taxation of
its property would rely on 49 U.S.C. section 11503, which went into effect after
February 4, 1979.
34
31. Id at 571, 215 S.E.2d at 767.
32. One North Carolina statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-342(c)(4) (1979), provides that any
"public service company" can obtain relief from an allegedly unequal assessment by showing the
existence of an "inequitable difference," defined by § 105-342(c)(4) to be 15% or more between the
level of assessment of locally appraised property and its property, which is appraised by the De-
partment of Revenue. Although this statute appears to be inconsistent with § 105-283 and § 105-
284, which require all property to be assessed at true value, § 105-342(c)(4) can be interpreted as a
cushioning provision to allow for good faith differences in determination of true value. This inter-
pretation of § 105-342(c)(4) bolsters the court's analysis of In re Bosley, 29 N.C. App. 468, 224
S.E.2d 686, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 551, 226 S.E.2d 509 (1976).
33. In re Bosley, 29 N.C. App. 468, 472, 224 S.E.2d 686, 688, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 551, 226
S.E.2d 509 (1976).
34. Section 11503 provides:
(a) In this section-
(2) "assessment jurisdiction" means a geographical area in a state used in deter-
mining the assessed value of property for ad valorem taxation.
(4) "commercial and industrial property" means property, other than transporta-
tion property and land used primarily for agricultural purposes or timber growing, de-
voted to a commercial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy.
(b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate com-
merce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or authority acting for a State, or authority
acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any of them:
(1) assess rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true
market value of the rail transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value of
other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the
true market value of the other commercial and industrial property.
(2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under clause (1) of
this subsection.
(3) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a
tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the
same assessment jurisdiction.
(4) impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier ....
(c) Notwithstanding section 1341 of title 28 and without regard to the amount in con-
troversy or citizenship of the parties, a district court of the United States has jurisdiction,
concurrent with other jurisdiction of courts of the United States and the States, to pre-
vent a violation of subsection (b) of this section. Relief may be granted under this sub-
section only if the ratio of assessed value to true market value of rail transportation
property exceeds by at least 5 percent, the ratio of assessed value to true market value of
other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. The bur-
den of proof in determining assessed value and true market value is governed by State
law....
49 U.S.C. § 11503 (Supp. IM 1979).
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In Alabama Great Southern Railroad v. Eagerton,35 eight interstate rail-
roads alleged that the State of Alabama was discriminating against interstate
commerce by assessing railroad property at a value that had a higher ratio to
the true market value than the ratio that other commercial property bore to its
true market value. The court held that 49 U.S.C. section 11503 prohibited this
tax discrimination against the railroads and that the state was required to re-
duce the assessment ratio to the ratio imposed on other industrial and com-
mercial property.
3 6
Ten railroad companies recently filed an action in federal court challeng-
ing the assessment practices in North Carolina. Prior to filing this action, the
railroads jointly commissioned a sales ratio study in North Carolina, which
they plan to use in this court challenge.37 Their probability of success is quite
high if they are able to show a five percent or greater difference in assessment
ratio.3
8
35. 472 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
36. This case is unusual in that the State did not challenge the railroad's assertion of a higher
assessment ratio. 472 F. Supp. at 61. Rather, the State merely wished to apply the old assessment
ratio in 1979, whereas the railroads claimed that the lower ratio should be applied. Id The court
found that the new, lower assessment ratio was the applicable ratio for 1979. Id at 64.
37. On October 21-23, 1980, the North Carolina Property Tax Commission heard an appeal
filed by Southern Railway Company, Norfolk Southern Railway Company, and Seaboard Coast
Line Railroad Company, in which these companies appealed the proposed 1980 ad valorem tax
valuations made by the North Carolina Department of Revenue of the companies' respective
system properties. The Commission upheld the valuation made by the Department of Revenue.
On April 8, 1981, these railroad companies joined seven other companies and filed an action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina challenging the assessment
procedures in North Carolina. Clinchfield R.R. Co. v. Lynch, No. 81-229 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 8,
1981).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 11503(e) (Supp. III 1979). In challenging an assessment in North Caro-
lina, a plaintiffmust first determine the appropriate forum in which to bring suit. The alternatives
are to seek to enjoin the operation of the tax system by suit in federal district court, invoke federal
jurisdiction under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or make the same
argument, and possibly a "true value in money" argument, before the State Property Tax Com-
mission, with a right of appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. See Brock v. Property
Tax Commn, 290 N.C. 731, 228 S.E.2d 254 (1976) (construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43
(1978)); King v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 316, 172 S.E.2d 12 (1970).
Accessibility to federal court is significantly restricted by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(1976). This section provides: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assess-
ment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may
be used m the courts of such State." Id The conclusion that this statute effectively precludes
filing suit in federal court is supported by the case law. For example, in Sacks Bros. Loan Co. v.
Cunningham, 578 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1978), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
district court's dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1341 of an action by a pawn shop owner alleging a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the inventory of his shop had been subject to the
Indiana personal property tax and the inventories of six other pawn shops in the same township
had not been subject to the tax. The court held that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy under
state law because the state constitution mandated an "equal rate of property assessment and taxa-
tion" and a state statute provided that "all tangible property which is subject to assessment shall
be assessed on a just valuation basis and in a uniform and equal manner." Id at 174. These
provisions track the language of the North Carolina Constitution and statutes closely enough to
support the conclusion that a North Carolina plaintiff would also have an adequate remedy under
the law of this state. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-283, -284 (1979). See also Robinson
Protective Alarm Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 581 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1978) (sustaining the refusal of
a district court to take jurisdiction).
Recent cases finding remedies at state law to be inadequate include Garrett v. Bamford, 538
F.2d 63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976), and Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 249 F. Supp. 894 (M.D. Tenn.), aj7'd, 389 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1966). Federal jurisdiction
[Vol. 59
PROPERTY TAX REFORM
was upheld a second time in Garrett by the Third Circuit. 582 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1978). (It is
important to consider only post-1940 cases in analyzing federal jurisdiction in this area: in 1932,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal courts should not take jurisdiction of state tax matters in
Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932). However, the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1341 was
adopted in 1940 because district courts had continued to exercise jurisdiction despite Matthews).
In Garrett, the state remedy was held to be inadequate because the claimed discrimination was
based on race, a fact probably not present in the instant case. In Louisville & Nashville R, the
state court remedy was held to be inadequate because it barred relief from discriminatory tax
assessments unless the plaintiff railroad could show that it had been assessed at more than "actual
cash value:' Even upon that showing the only remedy was an increase in the assessments of other
taxpayers. 249 F. Supp. at 903, 904.
There appears to be no North Carolina law on the issue of available remedies, that is, reduc-
tion in a plaintiff's assessment as opposed to an increase in the assessments of every taxpayer in
the plaintiffs class assessed at a lower rate than the plaintiff. In contrast, at the time of Louisville &
Nashville JR, there were several decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court holding that only
the latter remedy was available. Id at 903.
The United States Supreme Court has spoken on this issue, holding in Sioux City Bridge Co.
v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923), that a taxpayer whose property was taxed at 100% of its
true value was entitled to have his assessment reduced to the percentage of true value at which
others were taxed. In light of this authority, the North Carolina courts are also likely to give a
taxpayer this relief. Accordingly, there probably is an adequate remedy at state law.
In addition, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-322(g)(2) (1979) specifically requires that county boards
of equalization and review "hear any taxpayer who owns or controls property taxable in the
county with respect to the listing or appraisal of his property or theprop erty ofothers." (Emphasis
added). This section has been construed as giving a taxpayer a right to contest a county's entire
tax roll if the commissioners have failed to value property as required by law and if the taxpayer is
harmed by that unlawful valuation. Brock v. North Carolina Property Tax Comm'n, 290 N.C.
731, 228 S.E.2d 254 (1976); King v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 316, 172 S.E.2d 12 (1970). There seems to
be no point in requiring a taxpayer to show specific harm to himself if a concurrent specific rem-
edy (reducing his valuation) is not available.
The procedural law of the state also appears to afford the aggrieved taxpayer an adequate
remedy. The complaining taxpayer can first appeal his assessment to the county board of equali-
zation and review. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-322 (1979). Further appeal may be taken to the Prop-
erty Tax Commission. Id § 105-290. If this decision is adverse to the taxpayer he can pay the
assessed tax and bring an action in state court to recover the payment, King v. Baldwin, 276 N.C.
at 323, 172 S.E.2d at 16, with an ultimate right of appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
However, the standard of review followed by the state courts is unfavorable to the taxpayer.
In North Carolina, there is a presumption that ad valorem tax assessments are correct. Be-
cause of this presumption, a taxpayer challenging his assessment has the burden of proving that
the assessment is erroneous. In re Amp, Inc. 287 N.C. 547, 562, 215 S.E.2d 752, 761-62 (1975); In
re Basley, 29 N.C. App. 468,472,224 S.E.2d 686, 689 (1976) (citingAmp.). Furthermore, § 15OA-
51 of the North Carolina General Statutes delineates when a superior court, involved in the re-
view process, can reject the findings of the Property Tax Commission:
150A-51. Scope of review,'power of court in disposing of case.-The court may af-
firm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may
reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been
prejudiced because the agency findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constituted provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law, or
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S. 150A-29(A) OR 150A-
30 in view of the entire record as submitted, or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51 (1978).
Concerning rebuttal of the presumption that ad valorem tax assessments are correct, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has said:
[I]n order for the taxpayer to rebut the presumption he must produce "competent mate-
rial and substantial" evidence that tends to show that: (1) either the county tax supervi-
sor used an arbitrary method of valuation; or (2) the county tax supervisor used an illegal
method of valuation; AND (3) the assessment substantially exceeded the true value in
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. Current Practices
The practices39 of North Carolina assessors do not follow the guidelines
of the Machinery Act. Instead, most North Carolina assessors have adopted a
de facto system of fractionalized assessment. For example, in Columbus
County farm property is generally appraised at twelve percent of fair market
value and city property at thirty-five percent. In the current revaluation, farm
property will be appraised at thirty-three percent and city property at forty-
five percent. The change was due to a letter from an anonymous group of
urban property owners who threatened legal action if the gap was not closed
as much as possible.4°
Although not all counties are as far away from full valuation as Colum-
bus' twelve percent valuation of farm land, an examination of Property Tax
Commission documents shows many counties to be a good distance from the
money of the property. See Albemarle Electric Membersho Corp. v. Alexander, supra,
282 N.C. at 410, 192 S.E.2d at 816-17. Simply stated, it is not enough for the taxpayer to
show that the means adopted by the tax supervisor were wrong, he must also show that
the result arrived at is substantially greater than the true value in money of the property
assessed, i.e., that the valuation was unreasonably high.
In re Amp., Inc., 287 N.C. at 563, 215 S.E.2d at 762 (emphasis in original). See also In re Wag-
staff, 42 N.C. App. 47, 255 S.E.2d 754 (1979).
This limited review may work a hardship on the taxpayer whose proof of inequality has been
held to be inadequate by the State Property Tax Commission.
Where then should a suit be filed? The answer to this question depends on whether the
property in question is railroad property. A potential advantage to a nonrailroad plaintiff of filing
in federal court is that a federal judge will be making findings of fact and weighing the merits of
any sales ratio studies presented. If appeal is made to the county equalization board first, that
board will be passing on the equality of its own assessments. There is a lessened chance of conflict
of interest if a federal judge makes the findings as to equality of assessment ratios. However, the
potential advantage of filing in federal court is outweighed by the necessity of showing that no
adequate remedy exists at state law. The remedies available under North Carolina law appear to
satisfy the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
The conclusion is different if the taxpayer owns railroad property. The Railroad Revitaliza-
tion and Regulatory Reform Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (Supp. III 1979), prohibits discrimination
against rail transportation property. The Act specifically provides that a federal district court has
jurisdiction of an action brought under that section "[n]otwithstanding Section 1341 of Title 28
and without regard to the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties . . . ." Id
§ 11503(c). A plaintiff railroad will almost certainty file suit in federal court and convince that
court to take jurisdiction.
39. In the taxation of real property in North Carolina, there are two essential steps required
before a tax rate is ascertained. First, all property must be appraised. Appraisal refers to "the true
value of the property" as well as "the process by which true value is ascertained." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-273(2) (1979). Second, all property must be assessed. "'Assessment' means both the
tax value of property and the process by which the assessment is determined." Id § 105-273(3).
The difference between appraised value and assessed value was crucial under the old Machinery
Act, which contained different versions of §§ 105-283, 284, which allowed a county to tax a prop-
erty at an assessed value that was a uniform percentage of the appraised value. The percentage
was then known as the county's assessment ratio. The assessment ratio no longer has a de jure
existence in North Carolina. In 1974, a revision of the Machinery Act deleted the old assessment
ratio provisions and replaced them with § 105-283 and § 105-284. These provisions mandate that
the counties assess tax property at the full appraisal value. Thus, appraisal value must equal
assessment value and tax value must equal full market value. See H. LEws, THE PROPERTY TAX
IN NORTH CAROL NA-AN INTRODUCTION 4-5 (3d ed. 1978). Despite this revision of the Ma-
chinery Act, some counties persist in using an assessment ratio to value property. See text accom-
panying notes 36-40 infra.
40. Wilmington Morning Star, January 16, 1980, at 1-B, col. 1.
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100 percent mark. A random sample of consent orders between utilities and
counties shows the following range of appraisals:
Halifax County 65-80% of true value4'
Northampton County 65-69% of true value
42
Rockingham County 75% of true value
43
Stokes County 95% of true value"
Under the current system, this de jure acceptance of misfeasance by a
public official is difficult to justify, but if the figures are arrived at equitably,
fair taxing may result. However, the figures, particularly for Northampton
and Halifax Counties, indicate a range for valuation, leaving the possibility of
equitable taxation very much in doubt in those counties. But even the stable
figure in the Rockingham County consent order is brought into doubt when it
is analyzed further. In a sales/assessment ratio study conducted in the City of
Reidsville in Rockingham County based on 237 transactions, the results were
as follows:
Medium Ratio 73.6%
Coefficient of Dispersion 20.9%
Standard Deviation 31.7%
Coefficient of Variance 43.15%45
Although these figures appear rather meaningless at first glance, they are
significant in determining the equity of an appraisal. The medium ratio is
essentially equivalent to the rate of fractional assessment. In other words, land
was assessed at 73.6% of its subsequent sales price. The coefficient of disper-
sion showing how much variance there is from the median, indicates the quali-
ty and equity of the assessment procedure. A low coefficient, under ten
percent, is considered excellent, and the range of five to fifteen percent is con-
sidered acceptable; 20.9% clearly exceeds these limits.46
41. In re Appeal of Virginia Electric & Power Company, No. 1978-46 (Property Tax
Comm'n, Raleigh, N.C., Sept. 18, 1979) (consent order of Virginia public service company operat-
ing in North Carolina, from the level of appraisal of its property in Halifax County).
42. In re Appeal of Virginia Electric & Power Company, No. 1978-46 (Property Tax
Comm'n, Raleigh, N.C., June 13, 1979) (consent order of Virginia public service company operat-
ing in North Carolina, from the level of appraisal of its property by the Department of Revenue in
comparison with locally appraised property in Northampton County).
43. In re Appeal of Duke Power Company No. 1978-39 (Property Tax Comm'n, Raleigh,
N.C., May 1, 1979) (consent order of North Carolina public service company, from the level of
appraisal of its property by the Department of Revenue in comparison with locally appraised
property in Rockingham County).
44. Appeal of Duke Power Company, No. 1978-40 (Property Tax Comm'n, Raleigh, N.C.,
Sept. 24, 1979) (consent order of North Carolina public service company, from the level of ap-
praisal of its property by the Department of Revenue in comparison with locally appraised prop-
erty in Stokes County for 1978 and 1979).
45. Letter from William Connolly, Ad Valorem Tax Division Real Property Appraiser, to
Robert Cox, City Manager, City of Reidsville (August 31, 1979).
46. The standard deviation and coefficient of variation are used in arriving at the coefficient
of dispersion. This is illustrated by reviewing the steps taken in a sales ratio study.
Steps in Sales Ratio Study
1. Select sample that meets requirement that would insure that all sales have same
chance of being included in study. (All sales originally included).
2. Qualify sales to insure that only bona fide sales included.
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These random samples from several of the 100 North Carolina counties
indicate that, at the very least, these counties are not in compliance with the
provisions of the Machinery Act. However, it is clear from other records of
the Property Tax Commission that the remaining counties, to varying degrees,
also are not in compliance with the law.47 Clearly the law needs either
amendment or stricter enforcement.
III. PROPERTY TAX REFORM IN SISTER STATES
The North Carolina system of property tax valuation and assessment is
ripe for both judicial challenge and legislative reform. North Carolina is not
the first state to deal with these challenges, and the experience of her sister
states should be a guide for future reform in North Carolina. The trend to-
ward full value assessment has been a quiet revolution, with crucial battles
fought in the courtrooms and legislative halls of the states. In this section, the
problems, challenges, and reforms of other states will be discussed and
weighed as models for developing a reform statute.
A. New Jersey
One of the first cases to tackle the problem of full value assessment, Switz
v. Township of Mddletown,48 offers one of the most comprehensive sets of
judicial viewpoints on the full value assessment question. Five opinions were
handed down in the Switz case-the majority, a concurrence, and three dis-
sents.
The facts of Switz are typical of most cases in the full value assessment
area. A property owner, who had ascertained that her property had been over-
valued relative to other property in the township, brought an action against
the assessor seeking to compel assessment of all property in the township at
full and fair value. She also sought to compel equalization of all assessments
in the county to the level required by statute.
The court ordered the assessor of Middletown to assess property in that
3. Obtain appraised values of each sold property;
4. Compute individual ratio by dividing the appraised value by the verified sales
price.
5. Array ratios.
6. Identify median-more meaningful and less influenced by outliners.
7. Measure actual difference between individual ratio and median with no plus or
minus signs.
8. Sum the individual ratios.
9. Divide this figure by (N-1) one less number than the sum of the observation. Result
is average absolute deviation.
10. Divide average absolute deviation by the median. Result is called the coefficient of
dispersion.
47. Copies of these records may be examined at the office of the Property Tax Commission,
N.C. Department of Revenue, Two South Salisbury Street, Raleigh, N.C. See also Liner, Accu-
racy and Uniformity ofProperty Tax Assessmrents in North Carolina, 40 POPULAR Gov'T 29 (1975);
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, 1977, 2 TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUES AND
ASSESSMENT SALES PRICE RATES.
48. Switz v. Township of Middletown, 23 NJ. 580, 130 A.2d 15 (1957).
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township at full value. The Township of Middletown was also ordered to ap-
propriate the funds that would allow the assessor to comply. In addition, the
court granted a time extension:
The inquiry as to true value shall proceed, but the mandate otherwise
shall not apply to the tax years 1957 and 1958, thereby to afford the
Legislature the opportunity to take such measures and provide for
such administrative procedures as its own inquiry may prove to be
essential to the public interest, and to allow the Township time
needed for the fulfillment of the project.
4 9
The court then rationalized its delay:
It is the magnitude of the task of revaluation and the danger of
windfall inflationary spending that counsels so strongly against dras-
tic and abrupt action-the likelihood of even greater discrimination
by hasty and ill-considered assessments and the disposition to spend
when 'new' revenues are at hand, measured by the old tax rate, re-
strainable only by a statutory tax ceiling or 'freeze' in acordance with
the old rate mathematically readjusted, a measure that could
prejudice local fiscal action and work serious injury to the individual
taxpayers and hardship in other directions, but one that at all events
calls for the studied consideration of the legislative authority when
all the facts and circumstances are known.50
There were three dissents in Switz. 5 1 The first, by Justice Wachenfeld,
agreed with the majority that "the problem is basically legislative and adminis-
trative" (court's emphasis) but then chastised the majority for "inconsistently
proceed[ing] to solve it judicially." 52 He asserted that the court should not
overturn "almost a century of precedent in an area which it admits is 'legisla-
49. Id at 598, 130 A.2d at 25.
50. Id at 598-99, 130 A.2d at 25.
51. The fifth opinion in Switz was a concurrence to the majority opinion, which would have
reversed the lower court's findings in favor of the taxpayer. He would then have remanded the
case for further fact-finding, but retained jurisdiction. 1d at 613-14, 130 A.2d at 33 (Weintraub,
J., concurring).
52. 23 N.J. at 615, 130 A.2d at 34 (Wachenfeld, J., concurring).
Any discussion of the role of the judiciary in the evolution of the property tax assessment
standards in New Jersey is incomplete without reference to a line of cases that deal with the
manner in which a property owner proves inequality under a standard of fractional assessment.
The first in this line of cases, Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946), found no adequate
state remedy where a taxpayer who was discriminated against could not have his assessment
lowered but was forced to seek an upward valuation in the assessment of the other taxpayers.
This led to recognition of a constitutional right to review an assessment to see if it was in line with
the "common level" of assessment in that jurisdiction. See, e.g., Gilbraltar Corrugated Paper Co.
v. Township of N. Bergen, 20 N.J. 213, 119 A.2d 135 (1955); Baldwin Constr. Co. v. Essex County
Bd. of Taxation, 16 N.J. 329, 108 A.2d 598 (1954). See also LasserAssessment of RealProperty in
New Jersey: An Appraisal of the Baldwin Case, 9 RuTroaEs L. REv. 497 (1955). The New Jersey
courts, following this continuing evolution, next allowed a taxpayer to prove an average ratio if no
uniform ratio was present and have his assessment reduced to that average or common percent-
age. In re Kents, 2124 Ad. Ave., Inc., 34 N.J. 21, 166 A.2d 763 (1961). The court in Kents was
faced with a municipality that had a "hit and miss" assessment procedure with no uniformity.
Allowing the taxpayer to prove an average ratio and then reducing his assessment to that ratio was
considered an appropriate solution since it would encourage property owners with a higher-than-
average assessment ratio to litigate. According to the court's reasoning, this would be desirable
since it would force the municipality to reassess or be faced with a flood of litigation.. Id See,
ag., Piscataway Assocs. v. Township of Piscataway, 73 N.J. 546, 376 A.2d 527 (1977).
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tive and administrative' and constantly under the surveillance of and wholly
subject to the legislative processes."53 Justice Wachenfeld thus would not
have disturbed the present system absent legislative approval.
The second dissent was written by Justice Vanderbilt and concurred in by
Justice Jacobs. These two justices, citing the legislative and constitutional his-
torical precedents for true value, would have made the order effective immedi-
ately rather than two years later. The justices found the issues quite clear:
"whether we will recognize the clear and unmistakable mandate of the statutes
for assessment at true value and direct performance of the solemn duty of the
defendants to assess at true value or ignore it and make ourselves a party to
the positive disregard of the statutes."'54 The two justices then stated that
[A]ny such weakness on the part of the court in enforcing what is
clearly the law can lead only to disregard of its judgment. On the
other hand, by insisting on adherence to the standard of true value,
we effectuate the purpose and policy of the existing law, extinguish
the evils that have grown up from the acceptance of a percentage of
true value as an adequate standard of value and make policing of
abuses infinitely easier, in the interest of realizing equality of treat-
ment and burden.
55
In a brief dissent, Justice Jacobs crystallized the opinion of Vanderbilt:
The statutory direction for assessment at true value is unequivocal
and long-standing. When duly called upon in an appropriate legal
proceeding, our solemn judicial responsibility to insure fair fulfill-
ment of the legislative mandate is entirely clear. To meet practical
necessities, the Appellate Division granted a deferment of the the ef-
fective date of the original order and the record suggests no just need
for additional delay in this thoroughly litigated case before us; if
perchance any such need should appear, application by the township
and its assessor for reasonable relief may readily be entertained by
the Appellate Division.5
6
These opinions illustrate three basic judicial attitudes towards the ques-
tion of full value assessments. The majority, aware of the injustice and illegal-
ities that are inherent in an unauthorized fractional assessment system, but
also aware of the decades of precedents for this system, was unwilling to act
hastily to change. They therefore allowed a to-year waiting period in order
to avoid further injustices and havoc in revaluation. The two-year period also
gave the legislature time to amend the statutes if it so desired.5 7 The
Wachenfeld dissent took a more pragmatic approach to the situation. Recog-
nizing years of reliance on the de facto system of fractional assessment, Justice
Wachenfeld asserted that the legislature and the executive relied on the system
as it actually existed. Changing the system should not be achieved by judicial
53. Switz v. Township of Middletown, 23 N.J. at 617, 130 A.2d at 35 (Wachenfeld, J., dissent-
ing).
54. Id at 633, 130 A.2d at 44 (Vanderbilt, C.J. and Jacobs, J., dissenting).
55. Id at 633-34, 130 A.2d at 44.
56. Id at 634, 130 A.2d at 44 (Vanderbilt C.J. and Jacobs, J., dissenting).
57. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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action but rather by the people through legislative action. The final pair of
dissents by Vanderbilt and Jacobs offer a strict legalistic approach to the prob-
lem: a law is being broken; therefore we, as the judiciary, must immediately
correct this breach.
These three viewpoints in Switz are reiterated in the decisions of other
states. As will be shown in the analysis that follows, implementation of any of
these alternative viewpoints would have negative effects, either in taxpayer
morale, legislative support, or assessor morale and accuracy. A far superior
solution to the sort of litigation present in Switz is effective legislation before
the problem arises.
New Jersey's battle with fair value assessment did not end with the Switz
decision. Following the Switz decision and a tax commission study,58 the leg-
islature adopted a form of local-option fractional assessment that allowed a
county to adopt a uniform, county-wide assessment ratio. The assessment ra-
tio must be expressed as a multiple of ten percent and must be not lower than
twenty percent nor greater than 100 percent of value. Further, if a county
failed to adopt a ratio, its percentage would be set at fifty percent.
59
58. COMMISSION ON STATE TAX POLICY, NINTH REPORT (1958). This report, cited exten-
sively in Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566, 182 A.2d 841 (1962), recommended, after thorough exami-
nation, a uniform state-wide ratio of 40%:
So far as the taxpayer is concerned, assessments at a fraction of full value will make
no difference in his tax liability. It would cause no greater shift in the tax burden among
classes or among individuals regardless of what the present differences may be. He will
pay the same under 100 percent, 60 percent, 40 percent, or 10 percent assessments-
provided local budget requirements remain unchanged. If a uniform assessment re-
quires that the local average ratio of assessed value to true value be lowered, the tax rate
will increase; conversely, assessments at a higher local ratio would cause the tax rate to
decrease.
For psychological reasons, it seems best to adopt a fractional valuation. This valua-
tion must be selected so as to bring a minimum disturbance to conventional tax rates.
No matter what uniform fractional valuation is used, however, some tax rate adjust-
ments will be large, but this need not change the tax bill received by any taxpayer. Shifts
of tax burden among taxpayers in the same class and among classes of taxpayers will
occur-but only because of the establishment of uniform treatment, not because of the
fraction selected.
COMMISSION ON STATE TAX POLICY, supra note 97. The Commission concluded: "In view of the
wide public reluctance to accept 100% assessments, and despite the fact that there is no real differ-
ence between the two in the distribution of the tax burden, a uniform Statewide assessment ratio
for real estate should be established at 40% of the full valuation." Id at 100.
59. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:4-2.25, 4-2.26, 4-2.27 (West 1960) (amended 1964). These statutes
provided:
54:4-2.25 Standard of value for assessment of real property; taxable value
All real property subject to assessment and taxation for local use shall be assessed
according to the same standard of value, which shall be the true value of such real prop-
erty and the assessment shall be expressed in terms of the taxable value of such property,
which taxable value shall be that percentage of true value as shall be established by each
county board of taxation as the level of taxable value to be applied uniformly throughout
the country.
54:4-2.26 Percentage level of taxable value; limits
Every percentage level of taxable value of real property established by a county
board of taxation shall be expressed as a multiple of 10%, and no level so established
shall be lower than 20% or higher than 100% of the standard of value.
54:4-2.27 Time for establishment of percentage level of taxable value; uniform applica-
tion; alteration, failure to establish
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The local option assessment standard was unsuccessfully challenged in
Switz v. Kingsley. 60 The plaintiff argued that the local option was constitu-
tionally deficient because of lack of uniformity and that only a single statewide
ratio was appropriate. 61 The court held that the statute passes constitutional
muster since the tax is uniform within the taxing district of the local govern-
ment unit. The court brushed aside arguments relating to a state-wide prop-
erty tax, answering that no such tax currently existed, and if one were enacted,
the court would face the uniformity issue again at that time.62
B. Connecticut
Another state that experienced an early challenge to its system of frac-
tional assessment is Connecticut. 63 From 1860 until the challenge in 1957,
Connecticut required real property to be assessed at full value.64 However, in
a situation similar to that prevailing in North Carolina, the courts, with the
implicit blessing of the legislature, allowed the assessors to assess property at
less than full value. As early as 1893, the Connecticut Supreme Court allowed
a taxpayer assessed at a higher ratio than the lower, but illegal, prevailing ratio
to have his higher assessment lowered to the prevailing ratio.65 This result
was the rule in Connecticut until the 1957 E. Ingraham Co. v. Town and City of
Bristol66 case. In Ingraham the assessors had assessed the plaintiff manufac-
turer's property at three different ratios-100% of actual value for motor vehi-
cles, 90% for personalty, and 50% for real property.67 The plaintiff sought to
have all of his property assessed at the lowest ratio. The court reversed its
earlier stance and held that it would allow no reduction 6s and stated that the
assessor had acted illegally in using any base other than the actual value of the
Each county board of taxation shall, by resolution, establish the percentage level of
taxable value of real property on or before April I of the year preceding the tax year, and
the level so established shall be applied uniformly in such county for the purpose of
assessing the taxable values to be used in levying taxes for the calendar year next suc-
ceeding the year in which such level was established. The level so established may be
altered by any such board by establishing, on or before the date fixed by this section in
any year, a new level; but the percentage level last established pursuant to this act shall
remain in full force and effect for a period of not less than 3 years and until altered as
provided in this section. In the event that the county board of taxation for any county
shall fail to initially establish the percentage level for such county, then until the same
shall be done the level of assessment shall be 50% of the true value. The secretary of the
county board of taxation, not later than April 10 of each year, shall mail to the Director
of the Division of Taxation, to each assessor and board of assessors, and to the munici-
pal clerk of each municipality within the county, a copy of such resolution, or, if such
resolution was not adopted, a statement to that effect.
60. 37 N.J. 566, 182 A.2d 841 (1962).
61. Id at 572-74, 182 A.2d 843-45.
62. Id at 573, 182 A.2d at 844.
63. E. Ingraham Co. v. Town and City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d 563 (1957).
64. The court inIngraham traced the legislative and judicial history of the full value require-
ment. Id at 379, 132 A.2d at 565-66.
65. Randell v. City of Bridgeport, 63 Conn. 321, 28 A. 523 (1893).
66. 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d 563 (1957).
67. Id at 375-76, 132 A.2d at 564.
68. Id at 383, 132 A.2d at 567.
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property.69 The court thus refused relief to the taxpayer, although it acknowl-
edged the illegal conduct of the assessor.
70
The legislature moved quickly in the wake of the Ingraham decision. In
the same year, it amended the assessment statute so that all property that was
not legislatively exempt "shall be liable to taxation at a uniform percentage of
its present true and actual valuation, not exceeding one hundred percent of
such valuation, to be determined by the assessors. '7 1 This new standard re-
quired a three-step process: appraisal at full value, determination of a uni-
form assessment ratio, and computation of the assessment.
72
The Connecticut legislature amended the assessment statute again in
1974. 73 The statute now requires "fe]ach such municipality [to] assess all
property for purposes of the local property tax at a uniform rate of seventy
percent of present true and actual value. . . ."74 Thus, in Connecticut, a true
value system of assessment, with a local option of fractional or full value as-
sessment, was legislatively overruled, and a uniform statewide fractional as-
sessment standard was adopted.
C. Tennessee
The courts in both New Jersey and Connecticut recognized the statutory
imperatives of the full value standard as well as a right to enforce that man-
date. However, the legislatures in both states adopted fractional assessment
almost immediately after the cases were reported. A third state that has also
backed away from the full value standard is Tennessee. Prior to 1972, the
Constitution of Tennessee contained provisions for full value assessment. 75
Full valuation was supported by the state supreme court in 1901 when a prop-
erty owner sought to have his assessment reduced to the lower ratio common
in his jurisdiction.76 The court held that the proper remedy was not the lower-
69. Id at 380, 132 A.2d at 566.
70. The court apparently did not consider CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-170 (1949) which
provides for a $50 fine for an assessor who does any illegal act. Nor did the court grant relief
pursuant to Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923), which gave the plaintiff
relief similar to that requested in Ingraham.
71. Act of June 21, 1957, Pub. Act No. 673, § 6, 1957 Conn. Pub. Acts, 1090 (codified at
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-64 (1957) (repealing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1738 (1949)).
72. Lemer Shops v. Town of Waterbury, 151 Conn. 79, 85, 193 A.2d 472, 475-76 (1963). The
Lerner Shops court found that the assessors had merely assessed the property and skipped the first
two steps. The court then ascertained the true value of the property and then applied the aver-
aged ratio established by the property owner. Id at 90-91, 193 A.2d at 477-78.
73. Act of May 30, 1974, Pub. Act No. 74-299 §§ 1, 3 Conn. Pub. Acts 726-27 (codified at
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13-62a (1980)).
74. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-62a (1975).
75. TENN. CONST., art. 2, § 28 (1870) (amended 1973). This article provided in pertinent part
that
all property shall be taxed according to its value, that value to be ascertained in such
manner as the legislature shall direct so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout
the State. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected, shall be taxed
higher than any other species of property of the same value.
76. Carroll v. Alsap, 107 Tenn. 257, 64 S.W. 193 (1901).
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hig of his assessment but the increasing to true value of the assessments of
other properties in his jurisdiction.
77
Despite the clear constitutional mandate that property be taxed according
to value and that properties be classified for different rates of taxation, the
Tennessee practice continued to be one of classified fractional assessment,
with particular discrimination against railroads and utilities. The railroads,
aware of the apparent injustice and illegality of this practice, and cognizant of
the increased economic costs to their shareholders, challenged the system in
1939.78 The suit alleged that nonrailroad property was assessed at seventy-five
percent of value while railroads were assessed at full value7 9 and that this
discrepancy in assessment constituted illegal discrimination. The Tennessee
Supreme Court viewed things differently, however, and held that the state had
not acted in violation of the law. The railroad then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, which affirmed the Tennessee decision.80 The Court
noted in dicta that even if the railroads were discriminated against as a class
there was no violation of equal protection since the alleged discrimination was
apparently common to the whole class.8 '
77. Id at 284, 64 S.W. at 200.
78. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 176 Tenn. 245, 258, 140 S.W.2d
781, 786 (1939), aj'd, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
79. Id at 258-59, 140 S.W.2d at 786.
80. 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
81. Id at 368. The Court stated:
We must put to one side therefore all those cases relied on by the petitioner which in-
voked the Fourteenth Amendment against discriminations invidious to a particular tax-
payer. Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v.
Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350; Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441; Bohler v.
Callway, 267 U.S. 479; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board, 284 U.S. 23; Iowa-Des Moines
Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239. All these cases are inapposite. None denied power to a
state to apply different yardsticks to different classes of property. Equally irrelevant are
those cases in which this Court, because of the nature of the litigation, was construing the
uniformity clause of a state constitution, and was not applying the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Greene v. Louisville & I. R. Co., 244 U.S. 499; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greene,
244 U.S. 522. This Court has previously had occasion to advert to the narrow and some-
times cramping provision of these state uniformity clauses, and has left no doubt that
their inflexible restrictions upon the taxing powers of the state were not to be insinuated
into that meritorious conception of equality which alone the Equal Protection Clause
was designed to assure. See Puget Sound Co. v. King County, 264 U.S. 22, 27.
That the states may classify property for taxation; may set up different modes of
assessment, valuation and collection; may tax some kinds of property at higher rates
than others; and in making all these differentiations may treat railroads and other utili-
ties with that separateness which their distinctive characteristics and functions in society
make appropriate--these are among the commonplaces of taxation and of constitutional
law. Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321; Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142
U.S. 339; Florida Central & P. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U.S. 471; Southern Ry. Co. v.
Watts, 260 U.S. 519; Atlantic Coast Line v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413; Rapid Transit Corp.
v. New York, 303 U.S. 573. Since, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, a state
can put railroad property into one pigeonhole and other property into another, the only
question relevant for us is whether the state has done so. If the discrimination of which
the Railway complains had been formally written into the statutes of Tennessee, chal-
lenge to its constitutionality would be frivilous. If the state supreme court had construed
the requirement of uniformity in the Tennessee Constitution so as to permit recognition
of these diversities, no appeal could successfully be made to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment .... And if the state supreme court chooses to cover up under a formal veneer of
uniformity the established system of differentiation between two classes of property, an
[Vol. 59
PROPERTY TAX REFORM
The de facto fractional assessment affirmed in Browning continued to be
the practice in Tennessee. This practice was again challenged by a railroad in
1966.82 In this challenge, the railroad attacked on grounds similar to those
used in Browning, but this time buttressed their attack with the state constitu-
tion. After a showing by the railroads that their property was assessed at
between fifty-five and sixty-five percent of true value while other property was
assessed at approximately twenty percent, the district court ruled against the
state, finding that the discrimination was "systematic, intentional and of long
standing. '8 3 Despite this finding for the plaintiffs, the district court refused to
issue a decree calling for a reduction in the railroad's assessment. Citing the
disruptive effects that such a decree would occasion, the court instead ordered
the State Board of Equalization to "rehear and reconsider the assessment so
that it may be made to conform with the requirements of equal protection of
the law under the Fourteenth Amendment."84 The opinion was affirmed by
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.85
In a response uncharacteristically slow in property tax challenges, Ten-
nessee finally amended its constitution in 1972 to provide for classified and
fractionalized assessment.86 Following the adoption of this new article, the
exposure of the fiction is not enough to establish its unconstitutionality. Fictions have
played an important and sometimes fruitful part in the development of law; and the
Equal Protection Clause is not a command of candor.
Id at 368-69.
82. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 249 F. Supp. 894 (M.D. Tenn.
1966), aj'd, 389 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1968).
83. Id at 898.
84. Id at 904.
85. 389 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1968).
86. The new article 2, § 28 provides:
Taxable property-Valuation-Rates.-In accordance with the following provi-
sions, all property real, personal or mixed shall be subject to taxation, but the Legislature
may except such as may be held by the State by Counties, Cities or Towns, and used
exclusively for public or corporation purposes, and such as may be held and used for
purposes purely religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational, and shall except
the direct product of the soil in the hands of the producer, and his immediate vendee,
and the entire amount of money deposited in an individual's personal or family checking
or savings accounts. For purposes of taxation, property shall be classified into three
classes, to wit: Real Property, Tangible Personal Property and Intangible Personal Prop-
erty.
Real Property shall be classified into four (4) subclassifications and assessed as fol-
lows:
(a) Public Utility Property, to be assessed at fifty-five (55%) percent of its value;
(b) Industrial and Commercial Property, to be assessed at forty (40%) percent of its
value;
(c) Residential Property, to be assessed at twenty-five (25%) percent of its value,
provided that residential property containing two (2) or more rental units is hereby de-
fined as industrial and commercial property; and
(d) Farm Property, to be assessed at twenty-five (25%) percent of its value.
House trailers, mobile homes, and all other similar movable structures used for
commercial, industrial, or residential purposes shall be assessed as Real Property as an
improvement to the land where located.
The Legislature shall provide tax relief to elderly low-income taxpayers through
payments by the State to reimburse all or part of the taxes paid by such persons on
owner-occupied residential property, but such reimbursement shall not be an obligation
imposed, directly or indirectly, upon Counties, Cities or Towns; provided, that such tax
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Tennessee legislature in 1973 repealed the statutes requiring full value and
substituted the constitutionally mandated fractional assessments.87 The stat-
ute provides that public utility property be assessed at fifty-five percent of full
value, industrial and commercial property at forty percent, and residential and
farm property both at twenty-five percent.88 In subsequent attacks on the stat-
ute, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the statutes incorporated reason-
able classification and did not violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.8 9 The court, in a different suit, also found that the
classification of real property for purposes of taxation and the subsequent im-
position of higher rates on that property was not unconstitutionally arbitrary
or discriminatory. 90 Thus, Tennessee, like New Jersey and Connecticut, opted
relief for the years 1973 through 1977 shall be not less than an amount equal to the State,
County, and Municipal Taxes on Five Thousand ($5,000) Dollars worth of the full mar-
ket value (or One Thousand Two Hundred Fifty ($1,250) Dollars of the assessed value)
of property used for a residence by any taxpayer over sixty-five (65) years of age for a
period of one (1) year prior to the date of assessment; provided further, that such relief
shall not extend to persons having a total annual income from all sources in excess of
Four Thousand Eight Hundred ($4,800) Dollars.
The Legislature may provide tax relief to home owners totally and permanently
disabled, irrespective of age, as provided herein for the elderly.
Tangible Personal Property shall be classified into three (3) subclassifications and
assessed as follows:
(a) Public Utility Property, to be assessed at fifty-five (55%) percent of its value;
(b) Industrial and Commercial Property, to be assessed at thirty (30%) percent of
its value; and
(c) All other Tangible Personal Property, to be assessed at five (5%) percent of its
value; provided, however, that the Legislature shall exempt Seven Thousand Five Hun-
dred ($7,500) Dollars worth of such Tangible Personal Property which shall cover per-
sonal household goods and furnishings, wearing apparel and other such tangible
property in the hands of a taxpayer.
The ratio of assessment to value of property in each class or subclass shall be equal
and uniform throughout the State, the value and definition of property in each class or
subclass to be ascertained in such manner as the Legislature shall direct. Each respective
taxing authority shall apply the same tax rate to all property within its jurisdiction.
The Legislature shall have power to tax merchants, peddlers, and privileges, in such
manner as they may from time to time direct, and the Legislature may levy a gross
receipts tax on merchants and businesses in lieu of ad valorem taxes on the inventories of
merchandise held by such merchants and businesses for sale or exchange. The portion of
a Merchant's Capital used in the purpose of merchandise sold by him to non-residents
and sent beyond the State, shall not be taxed at a rate higher than the ad valorem tax on
property. The Legislature shall have power to levy a tax upon incomes derived from
stocks and bonds that are not taxed ad valorem.
TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 28 (effective 1973).
87. 1907 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 602, § 4, 2049 (repealed 1973).
88. Id In addition to adopting the classified assessment statute, ch. 602, § 4, the legislature
also adopted a slightly different valuation formula. The original formula for actual cash value,
"the amount of money the property would sell for, if sold at a fair, voluntary sale", 1907 Tenn.
Pub. Acts, ch. 602, § 4, 2049 (repealed 1973), was replaced with a standard enunciated as the
property's "sound intrinsic and immediate value, for purposes of a sale between a willing seller
and a willing buyer without consideration of speculative values." TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-606
(Cum. Supp. 1975). Such a standard would seem to limit the use of sales as a measure of value
and thus limit the probative value of sales ratio studies. If this was the intent, it was unsuccessful
in a recent case. See Consolidated Appeals of Public Utility Cas. (Tenn. Bd. of Equalization,
Nashville, Tenn. Nov. 20, 1978) (on file in N.C. L. Rev. office).
89. Snow v. City of Memphis, 527 S.W.2d 55 (Tenn.) appealdismissed, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).





Not all states that have been faced with full value assessment challenges
have legislatively adopted the fractionalized assessment standard. One of the
more resounding victories for full value assessment occurred in Kentucky.
The Kentucky constitution affirmatively required full value taxation:
All property, not exempted from taxation by this Constitution, shall
be assessed for taxation at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it
would bring at a fair voluntary sale; and any officer, or other person
authorized to assess values for taxation, who shall commit any willful
error in the performance of his duty, shall be deemed guilty of mis-
feasance, and upon conviction thereof shall forfeit his office, and be
otherwise punished as may be provided by law.9 1
Three statutes also implement the constitutional directive: section 132.440 of
the Kentucky Revised Statutes,92 which requires a taxpayer to certify that his
property was assessed at fair cash value, section 132.450(1),93 which requires
the county commissioners to assess property at full cash value; and section
133.150, 94 which requires the Department of Revenue to equalize assessments
to fair cash value.95
(1975). The classification of railroad property at a higher ratio than commercial and industrial
property violates 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (Supp. III 1979). See note 34 supra. This has been challenged
in Consolidated Appeals of Public Utility Cos., (Tenn. Bd. of Equalization, Nashville, Tenn. Nov.
20, 1978 (on file in N.C. L. Rev. office).
91. Ky. CONST. § 172.
92. Ky. REv. STAT. § 132.440 (1970).
93. Id § 132.450(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
94. Id § 133.150 (1970).
95. These statutes provide:
132.440 Oath of taxpayer on listing property
The property valuation administrator or his deputies shall read and administer to
every person listing property the following oath: "You swear that the list of taxable
property given by you contains a full and complete list of all of your property and of all
the property in your possession which is not othdrwise listed as of the assessment date,
and that a fair cash value has been placed on all such property required to be valued."
Id § 132.440.
132.450 Assessment; Special procedure and provision for assessing real property at
agricultural or horticultural value; Election by owner
(1) Each property valuation administrator shall assess at its fair cash value all
property which it is his duty to assess except as provided in paragraph (g) of subsection
(2) of this section. In the case of securities which are regularly bought and sold through
stock exchanges, the price at which such property closed on the last regular business day
preceding the assessment day shall be prima facie evidence of the fair cash value of such
property. The property of one (1) person shall not be assessed willfully or intentionally
at a lower or higher relative value than the same class of property of another, and any
grossly discriminatory valuation shall be construed as an intentional discrimination.
The property valuation administrator shall make every effort, through visits with the
taxpayer, personal inspection of the property, from records, from his own knowledge,
from information in property schedules, and from such other evidence as he may be able
to obtain, to locate, identify, and assess property.
Id § 132.450 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
133.150 Equalization of county or district assessments by department of revenue
The department of revenue shall equalize each year the assessments of the property
19811
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Despite this strict and clear scheme of taxation, the assessors failed to
maintain full value assessment, and the courts did not press them to fulfill
their statutory duties. In a 1918 case, Eminence Distillery Co. v. Henry
County,96 the plaintiff complained that it was taxed at an assessment ratio
higher than the prevailing sixty percent. The plaintiff further alleged that the
property was overvalued. The court reduced the assessment on the property to
the prevailing percentage rather than raising the assessment of other taxpayers
to 100 percent. The court then concluded that equal protection under the law
was a more preferable route than strict statutory enforcement.
97
The Kentucky Court of Appeals discarded the Eminence Distillery Co.
doctrine in Russman v. Luckett.98 The Russman plaintiffs, taxpayers, parents
of school children, and the school children themselves, sought a declaration of
their rights and an injunctive mandamus to compel the enforcement of the
constitutional and legislative fair cash value provisions. The Russman court
decided that despite over seventy-five years of noncompliance, the constitu-
tional and legislative provisions were still vital and enforceable.99 However,
the court realistically noted that immediate compliance and implementation
was an impossibility because of the longstanding disregard for the provisions.
The court also stated that it would be "unjust, impractical, and perhaps inef-
fective" to permit action against the tax officials for misfeasance. 10° The court
then fashioned its own remedy. First, the court concluded that by the January
1, 1966 assessment date, six months from the date of decision,
[t]he county tax commissioners, the Commissioner of Revenue, and
other public officials will be held strictly accountable for the per-
formance of their constitutional and statutory duties with respect to
the assessment of property for tax purposes on and after that date.
Such advance preparation as is necessary and proper to make the
transition from customary methods will of course be required. Mis-
feasance or malfeasance in this connection on or after the above des-
among the counties. It shall compare the recapitulation of the property valuation ad-
ministrator's books from each county with the records of sales of land in such county or
with such other information that it may obtain from any source and shall determine the
ratio of the assessed valuation of revenue shall have power to increase or decrease the
aggregate assessed valuation of the property of any county or taxing district thereof or
any class of property or any item in any class of property. The department of revenue
shall fix the assessment of all property at its fair cash value. When the property in any
county, or any class of property in any county, is not assessed at its fair cash value, such
assessment shall be increased or decreased to its fair cash value by fixing the percentage
of increase or decrease necessary to effect the equalization.
Id § 133.150 (1970).
96. 178 Ky. 811, 200 S.W. 347 (1918).
97. The rule in Eminence Distillery Co. has been followed in Luckett v. Tennessee Gas
Transmission Co., 331 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1960); City of Lexington v. Cooke, 309 Ky. 518, 218
S.W.2d 58 (1949); City of Louisville v. Martin, 284 Ky. 490, 144 S.W.2d 1034 (1940); Prestonbury
Water Co. v. Prestonbury Bd., 279 Ky. 551, 131 S.W.2d 451 (1939); McCracken Fiscal Court v.
McFadden, 275 Ky. 819, 122 S.W.2d 761 (1938).
98. 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965).
99. Id at 697.
100. Id at 699.
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ignated date would certainly be willful.1°I
The court then entered the following judgment:
(1) Declaring that section 172 of the Kentucky Constitution
and the statutory law implementing that section require all property
in Kentucky (not exempted by the Constitution) to be assessed for
tax purposes at its fair cash value and that this section of the Consti-
tution and the statutory law implementing it are valid, subsisting and
binding upon all public officials;
(2) directing the defendant Commissioner of Revenue to ad-
vise and instruct all county tax commissioners of their assessment
duties under the Constitution and the statutes of this Common-
wealth;
(3) directing defendant Commissioner of Revenue to inform
and advise all county tax commissioners of the substance and effect
of this opinion, and their duties thereunder,
(4) directing the defendant Commissioner of Revenue to take
appropriate steps to comply with his duties under KRS 133.150 and
other applicable statutes affecting property assessment;
(5) retaining this case on the docket for the entry of such fur-
ther orders as may be necessary and proper.'
0 2
The Kentucky legislature's response to Russman was immediate. A spe-
cial session of the General Assembly was called after the decision was handed
down, and "roll-back legislation," statutes that adjusted tax rates downward as
assessments increased, were enacted. Kentucky's general state property tax
rate was reduced from 5% to 1.5%. 103 After enacting a roll-back of the state
rate, the legislature imposed a "compensating tax rate" on the local units to
prevent an increase in the local tax burden. °4 Fractional assessment tax rates,
when applied to full value assessments, might have increased revenue ten
times over the present amount if the fractional assessment rate was ten per-
cent.105 The compensating tax rate was a rate that would provide the same
revenue as was raised in 1965. Thus, the state essentially set a budgetary limit
as a form of fiscal responsibility.1
0 6
Kentucky's move to full valuation has been relatively successful. An
evaluation of property taxes in the United States noted that Kentucky was one
of two states, the other being Oregon, "approaching full value assessment for
101. Id at 700.
102. Id
103. Act of Sept. 16, 1965, ch. 2, § 1, 1965, Ky. Acts, 1st Ex. Sess. 3 (amending Ky. Rav. STAT.
§ 132.020 (1942)).
104. Act of Sept. 17, 1965, Ch. 2, § 11(6), 1965 Ky. Acts, 1st Ex. Sess. 17 (amending KY. Rnv.
STAT. § 132.010 (1942)).
105. See Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W. 694, 696 (Ky. 1965).
106. For a detailed discussion of the Kentucky roll-back legislation and the exact workings of
the compensating tax rate, see Note, Property Tax Revenue Assessment Levels and Taxing Rates:
The Kentucky Roll Back Law, 60 Ky. L. J. 105, 118-40 (1971). For more information on the past
roll-back situation in general, see Student Symposium on-Kentucky Property Tax, 60 Ky. L. 75
(1971).
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all real property."' 10 7 In 1966, 96 of the 120 counties had achieved substantial
compliance. The remaining 24 counties needed assessment increases of only
10 percent to 35 percent to achieve equalization.108
E. Florida
Florida, like Kentucky, has both a constitutional provision and statutory
provisions calling for full cash valuation. The Florida Constitution of 1885
sought to impose taxes on "a just valuation of all property."'1 9 Florida stat-
utes prior to 1963 had equated just valuation with full cash value, 110 but in
1963 the standard was changed to the constitutional language of just valua-
tion."' In adopting the constitutional language, the legislature listed seven
factors to be considered in making a "just valuation":
1. the property's present cash value;
2. the property's present use and the highest and best use to which it
could be put in the near future;
3. the property's location;
4. the property's size;
5. the property's cost and the present replacement value of any of its
improvements;
6. the property's condition; and
7. the property's income." 12
107. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE PROPERTY TAX IN A
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 7 (1974) [hereinafter cited as INTERGOVERNMENTAL REPORT].
108. Luckett, The Administration Response to Full Value 4ssessment", in NAT'L TAX ASs'N
ANN. CONF. PROC., 197 (1966).
109. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 1. The current constitution contains identical valuation
language. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
110. See Act of June 7, 1941, ch. 20722, § 2, 1941 Fla. Laws 1934.
111. Act of May 31, 1963, ch. 63-250, § 1, 1963 Fla. Laws 600 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 193.011 (West Cum. Supp. 1978)).
112. The present statute provides:
In arriving at just valuation as required under § 4, Art. VII of the State Constitution, the
property appraiser shall take into consideration the following factors:
(1) The present cash value of the property, which is the amount a willing pur-
chaser would pay a willing seller, exclusive of reasonable fees and costs of purchase, in
cash or the immediate equivalent thereof in a transaction at arm's length;
(2) The highest and best use to which the property can be expected to be put in the
immediate future and the present use of the property, taking into consideration any ap-
plicable local or state land use regulation and considering any moratorium imposed by
executive order, law, ordinance, regulation, resolution, or proclamation adopted by any
governmental body or agency or the Governor when the moratorium prohibits or re-
stricts the development or improvement of property as otherwise authorized by applica-
ble law;,
(3) The location of said property;
(4) The quantity or size of said property;
(5) The cost of said property and the present replacement value of any improve-
ments thereon;
(6) The condition of said property;
(7) The income from said property, and
(8) The net proceeds of the sale of the property, as received by the seller, after
deduction of all of the usual and reasonable fees and costs of the sale, including the costs
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The Florida courts have been dealing with the full value assessment prob-
lem since 1919. In that year the supreme court decided, in Camp Phosphate
Co. v. Allen,113 that the major issue was not whether fractional assessment or
full value assessment was proper but whether assessments were uniform, fair,
and equal. However, the supreme court reconsidered the issue in 1944114 in
light of article X, section 7 of the Florida Constitution, a provision that
granted a $5,000 homestead exemption in property tax assessments.1 5 In this
later case the court reversed its earlier stance and held that, because of the
homestead exemption, assessment of property at less than fair cash value
would result in discrimination against nonhomestead property owners.
116
Several intermittent suits" 7 by taxpayers, beginning in 1961, set the stage for
the important decisions of Walter v. Schuler118 and Burns v. Butscher."19
In the first major Florida case, Walter v. Schuler, the court began its opin-
ion with apparent understatement: "From all accounts the tax roll of Duval
County for 1964 is a mess."'120 The court then sought to correct this mess.
First the court attempted to define the constitutional phrase "just valuation"
and concluded that fair market value and just valuation were equivalent. The
court then ordered immediate revaluation and reassessment of just valuation.
Finally, the court refused to allow the assessor simply to double the assess-
ments since this would compound the assessment problems already inherent in
the rolls.- The Sehuler opinion was successful in correcting the Duval County
tax rolls,' 2 ' but the scope and thus the impact of the opinion were limited.
In Burns v. Butscher the plaintiff taxpayer sought to require the State De-
and expenses of financing and allowance for unconventional or atypical terms of financ-
ing arrangements.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.011 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). Section 193.011(8) was added by Act of
June 30, 1970, ch. 70-243, § 8, 1970 FLA. LAWS 970 (amended by Act of June 27, 1977, ch. 77-363,
§ 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 1587).
113. 77 Fla. 341, 81 So. 503 (1919).
114. Cosen Invs. Co. v. Overstreet, 154 Fla. 416, 17 So. 2d 788 (1944).
115. It is interesting to note that Justice Thomas in Bums v. Butscher, 187 So. 2d 594 (Fla.
1966) points out the importance of the homestead exemption:
And we pointed out that the rate of taxation and the percentage of assessed valuation no
longer so complemented each other that assessments of less than 100 percent. [sic] would
distribute the tax burden equally as long as the assessments were uniformly applied.
Schleman, Tax Collector v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 151 Fla. 96, 9 So. 2d 197,
Walter . Schuler, infra. This was the inescapable conclusion because of the exemption
of $5000. [sic] on homesteads. In the absence of these fixed exemtions, disparity in the
relationship of assessed value to full cash value would not be so significant as long as the
percentage of valuation was universally applied within taxation units. However, the
only way now to escape the mischief that results from varied assessments is the valuation
of all property at 100 per cent. [sic] of its value as the legislatures of the State for at least
97 years, since Chapter 1,713, Acts of 1869, have said must be done.
Id at 594.
116. 154 Fla. 416, 416-17, 17 So. 2d 785, 788 (1944).
117. See Green v. Walter, 161 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1964); State v. McNays, 133 So. 2d 312 (Fla.
1961).
118. 176 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1965).
119. 187 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1966).
120. 176 So. 2d at 82.
121. See Burns v. Butscher, 187 So. 2d 594, 595 (Fla. 1966).
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partment of Revenue to exercise supervisory powers over local accessors. In
Burns, the court rejected the state's argument that the supervision would be a
constitutional infringement on the power of the assessors and held that the
state did have the power to supervise the assessors and was not limited merely
to advising them.122 The court added that the "[e]xercise of unbridled discre-
tion by 67 Tax Assessors without their being anchored to any master plan
would result in the imbalance already so clearly indicated."' 123 The court then
held that the Comptroller had the authority to institute suits to compel asses-
sors to follow the tax laws and assess property at 100 percent. The court also
held that the Comptroller could investigate the conduct of the tax assessors
and recommend their removal if they failed to perform their duties prop-
erly-'2
4
The response of Florida's executive and legislative branches in the quest
for fair value assessment has been limited. The legislature enacted roll-back
legislation in 1963 and again in 1973.125 In addition to these roll-back laws,
the Florida Constitution of 1968 provided for limited assessment classification:
agricultural land and land used exclusively for noncommercial recreation pur-
poses might be classified and then assessed on the basis of character or use.
12 6
This seems merely to allow an assessor to value agricultural land at its present
use instead of its highest and best use. In addition to these reforms, the legisla-
ture also increased the supervisory powers of the state tax commission.
127
F Oregon
Oregon's route to attaining full value assessment was quite unusual. The
Oregon Constitution requires "uniform rules of assessment and taxation" and
uniform taxation on the same class of subjects. 128 Although the Oregon Con-
stitution permitted classification under article I, section 32, the statutory prop-
erty tax scheme did not. Two sections of the Oregon Code provided for fair
value assessment. Section 69-101 provided for "assessment and taxation in
equal and ratable proportions, 129 and section 69-231 required the assessor to
assess property as "true cash value." 130 Despite the statutory mandates of full
122. Id at 595.
123. Id at 596.
124. Id
125. Act of June 13, 1973, ch. 73-172, § 13, 1973 Fla. Laws 331 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.065 (West. Cum. Supp. 1980)); Act of May 31, 1963, ch. 62-250, § 8, 1963 Fla. Laws 600
(repealed 1969) (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.03).
126. FLA. CONST. arti VII, § 4(a).
127. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 195 (West Cum. Supp. 1980).
128. OR. CONsT. art. IX, § 1, art. I, § 32. article IX, § 1 provides: "The Legislative Assembly
shall, and the people through the initiative may, provide by law uniform rules of assessment and
taxation. All taxes shall be levied and collected under general laws operating uniformly through-
out the State." Article I, § 32 provides: "No tax or duty shall be imposed without the consent of
the people or their representatives in the Legislative Assembly; and all taxation shall be uniform
on the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax."
129. OR. CODE ANN. § 69-101 (1930) (current version at OR. REv. STAT. § 307-030 (1979)).




value assessment, the familiar story of fractional assessment developed in Ore-
gon and gave rise to a civil action. In Appeal ofKliks13 1 the taxpayer alleged
that his property was assessed at a higher rate than other similar property.
The court noted that the Oregon statutes did not require full value assessment;
rather, "uniformity is more important to the taxpayer than appraisal in terms
of the correct number of dollars."'
132
The rule of Kliks, with minor variations, continued to be the law in Ore-
gon until 1961.133 In 1961, the Oregon legislature enacted two statutes that
affected property tax assessments. The legislation most closely tied to assess-
ment standards was an amendment that required all property to be assessed at
twenty-five percent of true cash value. However, if a county had a higher
ratio, it could retain but not increase it, and if a county had already contracted
for reappraisal at less than twenty-five percent, the adjustment was de-
ferred.' 34 The other statute created a tax court, which had the authority to
review and correct assessments. 135 The statutory mandate of a uniform assess-
ment ratio was implemented quickly. However, in 1967 the legislature once
again reformed the assessment standard and instituted full value assess-
ment: 36 This change from fractional assessment to full value assessment was




New York, like the other states mentioned, requires full value assess-
ment. 138 Full value assessment has a rich historical background in New York;
the full value standard can be traced back at least to 1788.139 Like assessors in
131. 153 Or. 669, 76 P.2d 974 (1938).
132. Id at 685, 76 P.2d at 980.
133. See Galloway v. Watson, 167 Or. 403, 118 P.2d 107 (1941); In re GeBauer Apartments,
170 Or. 47, 131 P.2d 962 (1942); Wadhams & Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 202 Or. 132, 273 P.2d 440
(1954); M & M Woodworking Co. v. Chambers, 217 Or. 161, 339 P.2d 718 (1959); Robinson v.
Stewart, 216 Or. 532, 339 P.2d 432 (1959).
134. Act of April 18, 1961, ch. 243, § 1, 1961 Or. Laws 297 (amending OR. Rv. STAT.
§ 308.232).
135. Act of May 24, 1961, ch. 533, § 1, 1961 Or. Laws 987.
136. Act of May 19, 1967, ch. 293, § 6, 1967 Or. Laws 357 (amending OR. REV. STAT.
§ 308.232).
137. INTERGOVERNMENTAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 225.
138. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 306 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1980).
139. See Act of March 7, 1788, ch. LXV, 1788 N.Y. Laws 769. The history of the New York
statute was traced by the New York Court of Appeals in 1975:
Section 306 of the Real Property Tax Law has an ancient lineage. In 1788 the New
York Legislature directed "the assessors of each respective city, town and place in every
county of this State [to] make out a true and exact list of the names of all the freeholders
and inhabitants and opposite the name of every such person shall set down the real value
of all his or her whole estate real and personal as near as they can disover the same"
(See L.1788, ch. 65, March 7, 1788.) In 1801 the standard was changed to "just and true
value" (L.1801, ch. 179, § I, April 8, 1801) and in 1823 was altered again to read as
follows: "all real and personal property shall be valued by the assessors for the purpose
of taxation, at the value they would appraise such estate in payment 
of a bona fide debt
due from a solvent debtor". (L.1823, ch. 262, § V, "All property to be assessed 
at its cash
value.") The term "full value" first appeared in a draft revision of 
1826-1828 providing
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most of the previously mentioned states, however, New York's assessors failed
to fulfill their statutory mandate. As early as 1852 one court, referring to the
fractional value assessment, noted, "if this be so, the practice should be cor-
rected." 140 However, 123 years later the assessors had not corrected their
practices. Finally, in Hellerstein v. Assessors of Islp, the practice of fractional
assessment was successfully challenged. Pauline Hellerstein, the owner of a
bungalow in the Town of Islip, sought to have the town's assessments re-
viewed, alleging that they were based not on full value but on a percentage of
the property's market value.
141
In defending its assessment ratio, the Town of Islip mustered the conven-
tional defenses to an assessment challenge. First, it asserted that previous de-
cisions by the New York Court of Appeals lowering assessments from true
value to the uniform rate indicated an acceptance of the fractional assessment
standard. The court rebuffed this defense, asserting that decisions "reducing
assessments to the uniform rate, are not premised on the legality of fractional
assessments," but are merely an attempt to do equity to an aggrieved tax-
payer.142
The Town further defended its position by arguing that the establishment
of the State Board of Equalization by the legislature indicated that the statu-
tory full value requirements are satisfied if the assessments are uniform
throughout the taxing unit. The court rejected this argument as well and
stated:
The only significance the board has in relation to this problem is
found in section 720 of the Real Property Tax Law which permits a
taxpayer in an inequality proceeding to rely on the ratio established
by the board in proving his claim. But this provision was merely
designed to ease the taxpayers' burden of proof in inequality cases
which, as indicated earlier, is not premised on the legality of frac-
tional assessments.
143
Finally, the Town argued that the statute had been violated for 200 years
and that the legislature, aware of this violation, had acquiesced. The court
also dismissed this argument:
that "All real and personal estate liable to taxation, the value of which shall not have
been specified by affidavit of the person taxed, shall be estimated by the assessor at its
full value, as they would themselves be willing to receive the same in payment of a just
debt due from a solvent debtor, but in the valuation of real estate, the term, 'solvent
debtor,' shall be construed to mean a debtor who is capable of paying all his debts,
without resort to the land to be valued." (Report of the Commissioners to Revise the
Statute Laws of 1826-1828, ch. XIII, tit. II, art. 2, § 16, "Of the manner in which assess-
ments are to be made.") This proposal was enacted into law in 1829 after the Legislature
deleted the last clause beginning with the words "but in the valuation of real estate"
(N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, vol. 1, ch. XIII, § 17, p. 393; see, also, L.1896, ch. 908, § 21, subd.
3; Cons. Laws of 1909, ch. 62; L.1933, ch. 470, § 18).
Hellerstein v. Assessors of Islip, 37 N.Y. 2d 1, 3-4, 332 N.E.2d 279, 280, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 388, 390
(1975).
140. Van Rensselaer v. Witbeck, 7 N.Y. 517, 522, 3 N.Y.S. 260, 261 (1852).
141. Hellerstein v. Assessors of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d 1, 332 N.E.2d 279, 371 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1975),
142. Id at 9, 332 N.E.2d at 284, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
143. Id at 9, 332 N.E.2d at 284, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 395 (citation omitted).
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In sum, for nearly 200 years our statutes have required assess-
ments to be made at full value and for nearly 200 years assessments
have been made on a percentage basis throughout the State. The
practice has time on its side and nothing else. It has been tolerated
by the Legislature, criticized by the commentators and found by our
own court to involve a flagrant violation of the statute. Nevertheless
the practice has become so widespread and been so consistently fol-
lowed that it has acquired an aura of assumed legality. The asses-
sors in Islip inherited the custom and it is conceded that they have
continued it. Throughout the years taxes have been levied and paid,
or upon default, tax liens have arisen, followed by foreclosure and
ultimate transfer of title, all on reliance on the apparent legality of
fractional assessments.1"
The court concluded that in the future the town should assess at full
value.145 It recognized, however, that an invalidation of the assessment roll
could bring fiscal chaos to the local government and that it had a responsibil-
ity to avoid disorder and confusion in public affairs. Thus, the court found
that past levies and liens made on reliance of the rolls were not before the
court and that interim assessments made in accordance with existing practice
would not be subject to challenge for failure to comply with the full value
standard. The court suggested that this judicial restraint was important in any
tax assessment case and urged it upon the lower courts.1
46
The legislative response to Hellerstein has been rather limited. In 1978
the legislature authorized a freeze on current assessment valuation, thus legal-
izing the existing system of assessment temporarily. Compliance with full val-
uation could then occur on or after January 1, 1981. This statute was
applicable only to those local units that had affirmatively provided for the
physical revaluation of property and were implementing that program with all
deliberate speed.147
A final solution to the New York situation does not appear to be close at
144. I d at 13, 332 N.E.2d at 286-87, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
145. Id at 14, 332 N.E.2d at 287, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
146. Id
147. Act of May 23, 1978, ch. 163, 1978 McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y. 351; Act of July 11,
1978, ch. 476, 1978 McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y. 823 (amending N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW
§§ 306 & 307 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1980)). The amended statutes were declared unconstitu-
tional in 1978 to the extent that they attempted to be retroactively applicable to pending proceed-
ings, since this constituted a denial of equal protection. Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors,
412 N.Y.S.2d 292, 302 (1978). In addition, the Slewett court held that to the extent the State
Board of Equalization was left without statutory guidelines for determining major types of prop-
erty and local assessors were given discretionary powers to select assessment ratios, the statute
granted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. Id at 300.
In addition to the legislative response to Hellerstein, two cases should be mentioned in con-
nection with property tax assessment standards in New York. Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gengold,
34 N.Y.2d 440, 315 N.E.2d 441, 358 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1974); 860 Executive Towers, Inc. v. Board of
Assessors, 385 N.Y.S.2d 604, 53 A.D.2d 463 (1976). In 1961 the New York legislature allowed
parties to introduce the state equalization rate as proof of a ratio in an assessment challenge. N.Y.
Real Property Tax Law § 720 (3) (McKinney 1972). However, courts were reluctant to give the
equalization rate weight without selected parcel and actual sale data. O'Brien v. Assessors, 20
N.Y.2d 587, 232 N.E.2d 844, 285 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1969). The court in Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v.
Gengold found, however, that the state rate was entitled to weight since it was objective and
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hand. The legislature, to date, has failed to develop an effective long-term
response to the Hellerstein decision. Two bills proposed in the 1980 session
are illustrative of this current inaction. A bill in the state senate would repeal
that part of the law that requires full value assessments. 14 8 This would leave
the system as it now stands intact and would effectively eliminate any stan-
dards for property assessment, a result probably unconstitutional under New
York law. A bill in the state assembly also would repeal the full value assess-
ment provision that prompted the Hellerstein decision and would replace the
old system with a classified property system. In addition, the bill would pro-
hibit revaluation of residential property by postponing residential tax in-
creases until after the property changes hands. 149 Neither of these two bills, as
weak as they are, appears to have any chance of passing. Instead, the property
owners of New York continue to be confused and angered by the full value
assessment changes that are proposed. The New York problem dramatically
demonstrates the need to solve the full value assessment problem legislatively.
IV. EVALUATING FULL VALUE ASSESSMENT
We have examined the constitutions, statutes, and case law of seven states
that have experienced challenges and changes in their assessment standards.
The challenges in each state have been costly in monetary terms as well as in
judicial time and taxpayer morale. The state with the least painful experience
in attaining full value assessment and with the best record of maintaining that
standard apparently is Oregon, a state that had no significant court challenges.
With this in mind, we suggest that legislative rather than judicial reform of the
property tax assessment standard is the appropriate means of change. In this
manner the people, through their elected legislators, are represented, and con-
stituency input will be given its proper weight.'50 Before we recommend a
arrived at expertly. The taxpayer no longer needed a sales ratio study, and the state rate was
conclusive evidence of the general level of assessment.
The 860 Executive Towers decision expanded the Guth decision and made taxpayer chal-
lenges easier. First, the court reaffirmed the Guth holding that the state equalization rate could be
utilized as the sole basis for determining the ratio. 860 Executive Towers, Inc., 385 N.Y.S.2d at
608. The court then held that this precluded the taxing unit from attempting to challenge the
methodology and underlying data employed by the equalization board. Second, the court found
that the taxpayers may use an expert witness to prove the ratios and ned not produce the equaliza-
tion board officials to testify themselves. Id at 610. Finally, the court indicated that once a tax-
payer had established the unit's rate, the unit was estopped from litigating issues that it raised in
earlier rate contests--the equalization rate established in a prior hearing was sufficient evidence in
a latter suit. Id at 612. The court also awarded the taxpayer reasonable costs and expenses when
he proved the correct ratio to be not in excess of the one for which stipulation was sought and
denied. Id
148.
149. See Tax Trouble in New York, PEOPLE AND TAxES (March 6, .1980).
150. See, e.g., Note, State ex rel Park Investment Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 21 CASE W. L.
Rv. 147, 147-54 (1969).
Even if strict uniformity is desirable for Ohio's system of real property taxation, a further
question is raised as to the propriety of the judiciary establishing the standard. The
entire subject of uniformity is in need of much study, and the legislature, with its fact-
finding facilities, would seem best suited for the task. Given the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision that uniformity is constitutionally required, the court still could have imple-
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number of different model statutes that might be adopted by the legislature, it
is appropriate to address three separate, yet integrated, questions that are im-
portant in making this legislative reform: why do assessors use the fractional
assessment standard; what are the merits of full value assessment; and, what
are the indicia of a good property tax system?
Although a vast majority of the states require full value assessment, asses-
sors in most states ignore the statutory mandate and assess at a fraction of the
property's valuation.' 51 In examining how the custom of fractional assessment
began, the United States Supreme Court speculated in an early case that, in a
jurisdiction where both land and personalty were subject to tax, the tax collec-
tor, aware of the difficulty of subjecting personalty to the tax, undervalued real
property, which is difficult to hide, in an effort to create a rough sort of equity
between owners of real and personal property. 152 However, as noted by the
Hellerstein court, this analysis is inappropriate now that many states tax only
realty. 153
The Hellerstein court was much less charitable than the Supreme Court in
attempting to determine why fractional assessment continued to be used:
Bonbright, in his treatise. . . lists. . . "several reasons for the
persistence of partial valuation. Gullible taxpayers associate a larger
valuation with a larger tax, or at any rate are less contentious about a
relatively excessive assessment if it does not exceed their estimate of
true value. The ability to maintain a stable rate and to increase reve-
nue by tampering with the tax base-a change which calls for less
publicity and less opposition-is naturally desired by the party in
mented its determination by seeking legislative guidance. For example, the Minnesota
Supreme Court, faced with a similar problem in Dulton Realy, Inc. v. State, was con-
vinced that "inequality between counties is as much a violation of constitutional require-
ments as is inequality within a county" and held that statewide uniformity was required.
However, rather than simply announcing its decision and remaining silent with regard to
the problem's practical solution, the Dulton court sought legislative guidance by defer-
ring to the legislature for implementation of its decision. By contrast, the Ohio Supreme
Court's action thrusts upon the BTA the burden of devising and promulgating a scheme
which conforms to the court's mandate. At the same time, however, the court has se-
verely limited the alternatives the BTA may utilize in implementing such a standard.
"So as the BTA wrestles with its problems, county auditors and taxpayers can hold their
breath. Only the seven judges of the Ohio Supreme Court seem unruffled by the trouble
they have caused."
Id at 153-54.
151. Hellerstein v. Assessors of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d at 10, 332 N.E.2d at 285, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 396:
The vast majority of States require assessors, either by statute or constitutional pre-
scription, to assess at full value, true value, market value or some equivalent standard.
(See Note, 68 YALE L.J. 335-387). Two States have expressly provided by statute that
this requires assessment at 100% of value (see 13 Auz. Rnv. STAT. ANN., § 42-227; Cali-
fornia Revenue & Taxation Code, §§ 401, 408). Several States have specifically author-
ized fractional assessments, and this seems to be the modern trend. In 1917 there were
four States in this latter category (see Greene v. Louisville Interurban AA Co., 244 U.S.
499, 516, 37 S.Ct. 673, 61 L.Ed. 1280); by 1958 there were eight (see Note, 68 YALE L.J.
335, 387); and, as of 1962 15 States had enacted legislation providing for fractional as-
sessments, either at a fixed percentage or according to local option (Note, 75 HARVARD
L. Rav. 1374, 1377, n.28).
152. Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U.S. 153, 163 (1879).
153. 37 N.Y.2d at 11, 332 N.E.2d at 285, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
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power. Occasionally, partial valuation is intended as a substitute for
a varied system of rates; i.e., different forms of property, while nomi-
nally taxed at the same rate, are in fact taxed at differing rates by
being assessed at different proportions of full values. Undervalua-
tion of realty is sometimes justified as compensating for the elusive-
ness of personalty; but even if the latter is assessed fully when caught,
experience has shown that the net result is to furnish an additional
incentive for evasion.
"Another inducement to undervaluation has been that, since the
state relies on the property tax for part of its revenue, the county
assessors seek to lighten their constituents' burden at the expense of
the rest of the state by assessing the local property at a lower percent-
age than is applied elsewhere. This process has often resulted in a
competition between counties as to which could most nearly ap-
proach the limit of nominal valuation. With the increasing trend in
some states toward reserving the property tax for the support of the
local communities, and in other states toward the creation of state
boards of equalization, the enthusiasm for percentage valuation has
been dampened."'
154
In addition, the Hellerstein court stated that since New York provides aid
to communities based on assessed valuation, it creates an inducement to un-
dervalue property. Despite attempts by the State Equalization Board to cor-
rect this situation, local officials apparently see no harm in trying to
undervalue property.155 The court also suggested that, since the state constitu-
tion provides that "assessment shall in no case exceed full value," an assess-
ment of less than full value discourages suits claiming unconstitutional
overvaluation.1
56
Other commentators have been less harsh in their evaluation of fractional
assessment procedures. One writer denies that the universal practice of frac-
tional assessment can be explained away by asserting that assessors are incom-
petent. Rather, fractional assessment results from policy decisions made by
assessors responding to social and economic needs. The need to prevent fiscal
collapse during depression, limit fiscal spending, encourage residential hous-
ing, and support unprofitable industries important to the community are all
policies that may be pursued by an assessor, virtually unfettered in his discre-
tion so long as he does not overvalue.157 Other commentators have agreed
with this interpretation of fractional assessment:
It is often felt that assessors should mistrust what are alleged to be
inflated market levels and interpret... full value under 'ordinary or
normal circumstances,' such a construction... will ensure the sta-
154. Id at 11-12, 332 N.E.2d at 285-86, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 397 (quoting I J. BONBRIOHT, VALU-
ATION OF PROPERTY 498 (1937)).
155. Id
156. N.Y. CONST. art XVI, § 2; see 37 N.Y.2d at 1-2, 332 N.E.2d at 286, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
157. See Comment, Tax Assessments of Real Properly" A Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 68
YALE LJ. 335, 336-41, 347-59 (1958) See also Lesnik, Does Full Value Mean Full Value? Prospects
forAssessment in New York in Light of the Experiences of Other States with Hellerstein Progenitors,
5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 235, 237-38 (1977).
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bility of the tax structure, facilitate advance planning by both the
government and the taxpayer and protect the government from
bankruptcy during a depression.'
58
The inexperience of tax assessors also can contribute to the use of frac-
tional assessment. Assessors are frequently part-time elected officials with lit-
tle or no training.159 Faced with a dearth of information on the value of
properties, few assessors have the current information needed to value prop-
erty properly-information such as location, size, quality of land, local selling
prices, construction costs, rentals, investment returns.160
However, not everyone agrees with these sympathetic portrayals of asses-
sors, or that fractional assessment is a benign practice. Fractional assessments
benefit those whose property receives an exemption, such as veterans and
homeowners. 161 Similarly, welfare recipients benefit from fractional assess-
ment since it allows them to hold more property without losing their eligibil-
ity.162 A more invidious reason has been proposed as well: most local
governments have an assessed value-to-debt limitation ratio imposed upon
them by the state government. To the extent that expenditures exceed this
limit, state expenditures or another tax must augment property tax receipts. If
a community has a low assessed value, it limits its expenditures and the state
must step in. State revenue is generally derived from sales taxes and income
taxes. To the extent that fractional assessment leads to expenditures that are
supplemented by the state or federal government, taxes shift to nonproperty
owners through the sales and income taxes. But the cycle does not end there.
When arbitrary undervaluation by a county assessor shifts taxes to
the State-assessed utilities, it is again non-property owners who pick
up the tab in the form of higher rates for utility services. The
shiftability [to consumers] of property taxes on monopoly utilities is
guaranteed by the Public Utilities Commission, which sets their
rates. Those who look with satisfaction upon the relative overassess-
ment of utilities, who see in that practice the restraint of 'big corpo-
rate monopolies', are uninformed. Utilities are not taxpayers, but tax
collectors. Utility customers pay the tax.
163
The New York court found all of these to be good reasons for abolishing
the custom of fractional assessment. "'Theoretically the taxpayer's pocket is
not in the least affected by uniform undervaluation or overvaluation. System-
atic undervaluation diminishes the tax base and the tax rate must therefore
158. Note, Inequali y in Property Tax Assessment: New Cures for Old Ills, 75 HARVARD L.
Rv. 1374, 1379 (1962).
159. Assessors are not elected officials in North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-296, -
299 (1979).
160. Note, Equality in Property Taxation-The Law, Practice and Prospects, 11 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 617, 621 (1976).
161. See note 115, supra. Thus a homeowner eligible for the $5000 homestead exemption in
Florida will pay no taxes on a $20,000 home if the fractional assessment ratio is 23% yielding a
$4600 assessment value on his home.
162. See, e.g., CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE §§ 11150 to 11153 (West 1980).
163. Tideman, FractionalAssessments-Do Our Courts Sanction Inequali y? 16 HASTINGS L.J.
573, 579 (1965).
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rise in order to supply the required government revenue.' ,164 The court con-
cluded:
"The objections to the practice of undervaluation are patent. In the
first place, except where sanctioned by statute, it involves a generally
known and sanctioned disregard by officials of the law requiring
them to assess property at its full and fair value. The other great vice
is that the percentage of undervaluation is rarely a matter of common
knowledge, so that it is extremely difficult to ascertain whether there
is uniformity in the proportion or whether, through incompetence,
favoritism, or corruption of the assessors, some portions of the tax-
paying body are bearing the others' burdens, as between either indi-
viduals or local groups."'
165
Despite the plethora of evidence indicting fractional assessment, the justi-
fication of a full value assessment standard is not simple. The primary reasons
for supporting fair market assessment are too often stated in the negative-as
arguments against fractional assessment-and these reasons often appear to be
too simplistic. Despite these shortcomings, two obvious factors tilt the balance
in favor of full value assessment-fairness and simplicity. Full value assess-
ment is fair because a taxpayer is aware that his property is taxed at 100 per-
cent of its value. It is simpler, because it avoids one step in the assessment
valuation-the decrease from fair value to the fractional assessment.
Full valuation is clearly fairer than fractional valuation because it allows
the taxpayer to know at exactly what value his property has been appraised-
the assessed value and the appraised value are identical. In the case of frac-
tional assessments, misinformed taxpayers associate a larger valuation with a
larger tax and thus favor the partial assessment. 166 A taxpayer, even when
overassessed relative to other similarly situated taxpayers, is less likely to chal-
lenge the assessed value so long as it does not exceed his own valuation of the
property. This is particularly true when the ratio is unknown. If fractional,
rather than full value, assessment is used, slight unnoticed variations in the
fraction might also be used as an invidious form of classification. 167
In addition to being more equitable to the taxpayer, full valuation forces
the assessor to affirmatively value a property. Despite the seeming redun-
dancy of that statement, it is quite evident that fractional assessment has led to
sloppy appraisal techniques in many states:
Failure to obey full-value requirements is but one aspect of the hap-
hazardness which often characterizes the assessing process and to
which much of the prevailing inequality may be traced. Not only do
assessors feel free to assess at only a fraction of full value, but some-
times, relying on the wide latitude derived from using an unpub-
lished percentage, they estimate the "fractional" valuation directly
164. Hellerstein, 37 N.Y.2d at 12-13, 332 N.E.2d at 286, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 398 (quoting I J.
BONBRIGrT).





without even attempting to first determine full value. "I personally
wouldn't know where to begin to find such a figure," the chairman of
the board of assessors in Wenham, Massachusetts, said recently.
Other Massachusetts assessors likewise testified to the absence of val-
uation standards: "[There is.no particular method here," the Mel-
rose chairman admitted, and the Marshfield assessor complained that
"we should have a system to go by, not just guesswork." Even when
state statutes or regulations direct that certain factors be taken into
account in making an assessment, they rarely attempt to specify the
relative weight to be accorded to each factor. "[Olpinion rather than
evidence plays a strong role in the assessing process," a North Caro-
lina observer reports, "estimation rather than measurement becomes
the method of appraisal.'
168
A full value assessment standard is simpler to administer. At a very basic
level, it is easier to equate appraised value and assessed value rather than have
a fraction of appraised value equal assessed value. As one court stated: "It is
apodictic that a percentage of ["just valuation"] cannot be computed without
first establishing ["just valuation"] and the assessors upon reaching the first
figure are enjoined not to proceed to the second."
169
The advantages and disadvantages of full value assessment have been
summarized in a study by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations. They list the advantages of a statewide full value standard:
1) full value assessment reduces the possibility of sloppy, polit-
ically-oriented, or corrupt assessments;
2) it increases uniformity, thereby reducing inequities between
taxpayers and tax districts;
3) it reduces costs because it makes maximum use of market
information;
4) it promotes taxpayer understanding since the taxpayer is
most likely to be aware of the actual market value of his own prop-
erty.
170
The disadvantages that the Advisory Commission listed included:
1) high start-up costs caused by the fact that most states are a
long way from full-value assessment;
2) increased work loads for assessors and their staffs to keep
records current;
3) a significant disruption in existing state-local relations as a
government function and corresponding political power is shifted
from the local assessor's office to a state supervising agency;
4) taxpayer fears that the large increases in the property tax
base which would occur in most taxing districts would not be accom-
panied by a commensurate reduction in tax rates.171
168. Note, supra note 158, at 1379.
169. Walter v. Schuler, 176 So. 2d 81, 85 (Fla. 1965).
170. INTERGOvERNMENTAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 4.
171. Id at 5.
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The final issue worthy of exploration before proceeding to a model tax
proposal is the characteristics of a "good property tax." Adam Smith first at-
tempted to identify the primary qualities of a good tax when he proposed four
maxims applicable to taxes in general:
First, taxes on individuals should be 'in proportion to their re-
spective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they re-
spectively enjoy under the protection of the State.' Secondly, 'the tax
each individual should pay should be certain, not arbitrary.' Third,
'every tax should be levied at a time, or in the manner, in which it is
most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it.' Fourth,
'every tax should be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out
of the pockets of people as little as possible over and above what it
brings into the public treasury of the State.
' 72
This last maxim Smith interpreted to mean that a tax (1) should be capa-
ble of economical administration, (2) should not 'obstruct the industry of the
people,' (3) should not offer undue opportunities for evasion, and (4) should
not impose 'unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression' upon the public.
Modem economists and tax analysts have developed their own lists of
criteria in the evaluation of various taxes. 173 Although some of the criteria
developed by these distinguished economists are useful in analyzing the prop-
172. See A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS Book V, ch. II, pt. II.
173. A few of these criteria are summarized below:
I believe that the legislative, administrative, and judicial history of the federal income
tax, as well as the pertinent literature, reveals the existence of seven pervasive purposes
which have shaped its rates and structure. These are (1) to supply adequate revenue, (2)
to achieve apractical and workable income tax system, (3) to impose equal taxes upon
those who enjoy equal incomes, (4) to assist in achieving economic stabilty, (5) to reduce
economic inequality, (6) to avoid impairment of the operation of the market-oriented
economy and (7) to accomplish a high degree of harmony between the income tax and
the sought-forpolitical order.
Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 568 (1965);
(1) Taxes should be fair, and not arbitrary.
(2) Taxes should reduce inequalities in wealth, income, and power.
(3) Taxes should preserve human resources.
(4) Taxes should preserve a wide market; they should not aggravate oversaving.
(5) Taxes should preserve incentives.
(6) Taxes should be as direct as feasible.
(7) Direct taxes should be widely shared.
(8) Taxes should be adequate.
(9) Tax reductions and increases should be administered to reduce business insta-
bility.
H. GROvES, POSTWAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 373,374, in JACOBY, GUIDELINES OF
INCOME TAX REFORM FOR THE 1960's, Houss COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST
SEss., I TAX REViSION COMPENDIUM 157, 158-60 (Comm. Print 1959);
(1) [A] tax climate more favorable to economic growth; (2) greater equity through
closer adherence to the principle that equal incomes should bear equal tax liabilities; (3)
assurance that the degree of progression in the distribution of tax burdens accords as
closely as possible with widely held standards of fairness; (4) an overall tax system which
contributes significantly to maintaining stability in the general price level and a stable
and high rate of use of human and material resources; (5) a tax system which interferes
as little as possible with the operation of the free market mechanism in directing re-




erty tax, most are rarely on point. The study by the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations offers an analysis geared to the property tax:
Openness: Keeping the Taxpayer Informed
A State Should:
1. Conduct annual studies of the relationship between assessed
value and sale price, and publish such assessment-sales ratios.
2. Require assessors to send each real property taxpayer,
before preparation of the final property assessment lists, a notice con-
taining the assessment information the taxpayer needs to judge the
fairness of his assessment, and also telling him how, when, and where
to appeal an assessment he feels is unfair.
3. Provide an assessment appeals procedure that. is readily ac-
cessible, utilizes rather informal procedures, and is staffed by profes-
sionally qualified persons who can exercise independent judgment
about the accuracy of an assessment.
4. Provide that State assessment-sales ratios are admissible as
evidence in support of an assessment appeal (with a prescribed "tol-
erance zone" or margin of error that recognizes that property ap-
praisal is not an exact science).
Technical Proftciency.* Organization for High-Quality Appraisal
A State should:
1. Assign responsibility for primary appraisal of real property
to jurisdictions that are large enough to make effective and efficient
use of specialized personnel and equipment (at least county-wide).
2. Select appraisal personnel on the basis of their professional
qualifications and ability to administer (and to keep current) a mar-
ket value, mass-appraisal system.
3. Conduct State training and certification programs for ap-
praisers at both the entry and advanced levels.
4. Provide strong State-level guidance and technical assistance
to local appraisal districts (if appraisal is not completely centralized
at the State level).
5. Commit sufficient fiscal resources to real property appraisal
to (a) permit each parcel of property to be physically inspected and
appraised at least every three years and (b) make adjustments of ap-
praisals and assessments between major reappriasal efforts to keep
them current with market developments.
Compassion: Relieffrom Extraordinary Property Taxes
A State should:
1. Relieve extraordinary property tax burdens for renters as
well as for homeowners.
2. Relieve extraordinary property tax burdens for the non-eld-
erly as well as for the elderly.
Mills, Foreward, HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs, 86TH CONG., IST SESS. I TAx REvisIoN
COMPENDIUM, IX (Comm. Print 1959).
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3. Relieve extraordinary property tax of moderate-income, as
well as destitute, households.
4. Provide some relief to farmers (either circuit-breaker or tax
deferral) to keep rising property taxes from forcing premature con-
version of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses.
5. Mandate such relief on a statewide basis.
6. Fund such relief at the State, rather than local, level. 174
V. PROPOSED MODEL LEGISLATION
Working within the constraints of the North Carolina Constitution, the
reformer must keep at least two thoughts in mind. First, any tax must be uni-
form within a class. Second, only the legislature may designate a classifica-
tion. 7
5
The first piece of legislation would be an amendment of the appraisal and
assessment statutes-sections 105-283 and 105-284 of the North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes. 176 This revision would be in several parts:
(1)(a) Uniform Appraisal Standard-All appraisals of property
shall be made at 100 percent of true value in money.
(b) The words "true value" are equivalent, for purposes of this
article, to fair market value, full value, true cash value unless other-
wise defined herein.' 77 True value shall also be interpreted as the
price, estimated in terms of money at which the property would
change hands between a willing and financially able buyer and a
willing seller, neither under compulsion to buy or to sell and both
having reasonable knowledge of all the uses to which the property is
adapted and for which it is capable of being used.
(2)(a) Uniform Assessment Standard-All property, real and
personal, within each county and municipality, shall be assessed at
100 percent of its true value in money.
(b) In the cases of farm land, timber land, noncommercial rec-
reational land, and vacant land, true value shall be interpreted as the
value of the land at its present use. The assessor shall value such
property only at the value which a willing buyer would pay a willing
seller if the current use were the highest and best use of the prop-
erty.
178
(c) No assessment shall be other than equal to the appraised
value of the property unless specifically exempted by an act of the
174. INTERGOvERNMENTAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 330-31.
175. The former requirement is the subject of an excellent law review article by Lewis, Prop.
erty Tar ClasspFcation and Exemptioir 4 Problem in North Carolina Constitutional Law, 37 N. C.
L. REv. 115 (1958).
176. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-283, -284 (1979).
177. The words herein are necessary for the adoption of any of the following sections.
178. This amendment would effectively classify specific types of property to be assessed at a
different fair market value. It would also effectively repeal N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-277.4 (1979),





Once the assessment and appraisal standards have been set at a full value
standard, the procedures for the administration of the standards must be set
out. Properly trained assessors and technical proficiency in assessment will
assure the use of a full value assessment standard. Effective property appraisal
at full value requires well-trained personnel, adequate information, appropri-
ate techniques, and an effective, efficient framework of state administration.
This administration may be either completely centralized or marked by strong
state coordination of local appraisers.' 80 North Carolina presently provides
for state certification of assessors, 18 1 but in order to upgrade the quality of
appraisals made in North Carolina, the state might adopt an assessor training
program. These programs are operative in a number of states' 82 and those
states offer models 183 for a North Carolina statute. Georgia recently adopted
179. This provision is worded in order to insure that the provision is mandatory and not
merely directory.
180. INTERGOVERNMENTAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 18.
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-296f (1979).
182. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 20.
183. Statutes adopted by states other than Georgia include those of Tennessee and California:
Tennessee:
67-333. Qualifications.-To assure that the assessment functions will be performed
in a professional manner by competent assessors, meeting clearly specified professional
qualifications, the state board of equalization is authorized and directed to prescribe
educational and training courses to be taken by assessors and their deputies, and to spec-
ify qualification requirements for certification of any one who is to be engaged to ap-
praise and assess property for the purpose of taxation. The state board of equalization
may authorize the division of property assessments to administer this function under the
control and supervision of the state board, to specify the certification requirements of
persons who are to be certificated as qualified as local assessor of property and to pre-
scribe qualifications of those who are to be certified as qualified to act as deputy asses-
sors. Any specifications or quaifications which shall be determined upon as a
prerequisite to receiving and holding a certificate from the state board of equalization as
qualified to be an assessor or a deputy assessor of property shall be approved and
promulgated by the state board of equalization.
Provided, however, that it is the legislative intent that the provisions of this section shall
not serve to prevent any duly elected or appointed assessor of property from assuming
such office or performing his legally speified duties.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-333 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
67-336. Schools and field training courses.-The state board of equalization, out of
funds available to it by appropriation, may enter into contracts with educational or pro-
fessional institutions or organizations conducting schools and field training courses for
all Tennessee assessors and their deputies in keeping with standards and qualifications
adopted or to be adopted.
Id § 67-336.
California:
59 § 671. Annual training; failure to receive as grounds for revocation of certifi-
cate; advanced appraiser's certificate; qualifications for issuance
(a) In order to retain a valid appraiser's certificate every holder shall * * * cor-
plete at least 24 hours of training conducted or approved by the State Board of Equaliza-
tion in each one-year period * * *.
Any excess in training time over the 24-hour minimum accumulated in any one year
shall be carried over as credit for future training requirements with a limit of three years
in which the carryover time may be credited * * *
Failure to receive such training shall constitute grounds for revocation of an ap-
praiser's certificate; conducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act con-
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a comprehensive training statute, which provides in pertinent part:
91A-1435 Qualifications
(a) No person shall serve as a member of the county board of
tax assessors who:
(2) Fails to make his residence within the county within six
months after taking the oath of office as a member of the board.
(3) Does not hold a high school diploma or its equivalent. A
person who has held an equivalent responsible position of employ-
ment for a period of five years shall not be required to meet the high
school education requirement as provided in this paragraph. The
commissioner is authorized to specify by regulation the types of em-
ployment qualifying as equivalent responsible positions of employ-
ment under the terms of this paragraph.
(4) Does not have at least one year of experience in appraisal
related work. The successful completion of 40 hours of approved
appraisal courses as provided for in subsection (c), taken either prior
to appointment or within one year after appointment, may be substi-
tuted for this experience requirement.
(5) Has not successfully completed an assessor examination to
be administered by the commissioner or has not successfully com-
pleted at least 40 hours of approved appraisal courses as provided in
subsection (c).
(6) Does not successfully complete at least 40 hours of ap-
proved appraisal courses as provided in subsection (c) during each
two years of his tenure as a member of the county board of tax asses-
sors.
tained in Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 11500) of Part I of Division 3 of Title 2 of
the Government Code.
Training shall include, but not be limited to, new developments in the case and
statutory law and administrative rules.
(b) An advanced appraiser r certocate shall be issued by the board after an applicant
has held an appraiser's certVicatefor at least three years and,-
(1) Has succesfully completed a course of study; or
(2) Haspassed an advanced level examination; or
(3) Holds a valid professional designation from a recognized professional organiza-
tion.
The board, with the advice andassistance of/ive assessors selected by the StateAssoci-
ation of County Assessors of California, shall prescribe the course of study, prepare the
advanced level examination, and approve the professional designation.
In order to retain a valid advanced appraiser's certfcate, every holder shall complete
at least 12 hours of training in each one-yearperiod
Any excess in training time for the advanced appraiser'r certiFcate over the. 12-hour
minimum accumulated in any one year shall be carried over as a creditforfuture training
requirements with a limit of two years in which the carryover time may be credited
Failure to receive such training shall constitute groundsfor revocation of an advanced
appraiser's certfcate; provided, however, that proceedings to revoke shall be conducted in
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act contained in Chapter 5 (commencing
with Section 11500) of Part I of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
Training to retain the advanced appraiser's cert#Ffcation shall include, but not be limited
to, new developments in the case and statutory law and administrative rules.
CAL. Rlv. & TAx. CODE §-671 (West Supp. 1979) (Italics indicate changes or additions by
amendment) (Asterisks indicate deletions by amendment).
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(c) Approved appraisal courses shall be courses of instruction
covering the basic principles of appraisal and assessing of all classes
and types of property including instruction in the fundamentals of
Georgia law covering the appraisal and assessing of property for ad
valorem tax purposes as prescribed and designated by the commis-
sioner. The commissioner shall develop and administer courses of
instruction designed to qualify applicants or tax assessors under the
terms of this section and he may contract with any professional ap-
praisal organization or firm or institution of higher education in this
State to provide the necessary courses of instruction or any part of
any such course.184
Drawing on the Georgia model, the University of North Carolina could
develop an assessor training program that could serve the needs of the state.
The Institute of Government, with adequate funding support, could develop
and administer the program.
A simple procedure, and possibly one of the best methods of assuring
assessor compliance to a full value assessment standard, is to provide adequate
taxpayer notice, as proposed in the following model legislation:
(1) Each property taxpayer shall receive a notice 60 days
before the tax roll becomes finalized. Such notice shall include:
(a) the appraised market value of the property being taxes.
(b) the assessed value of the property.
(c) the ratio of assessed value to market value.
(d) a statement of the taxpayer's right to appeal the assess-
ment. Such statement shall contain instructions as to how, where,
and when appeals may be taken.
(2) Sixty days after such notice is given to all taxpayers, the tax
roll may be finalized. A copy of the finalized tax roll shall be filed at
(1) every municipal hall in the taxing district and (2) every public
library in the taxing district.
185
The above statute is basically an attempt to give the taxpayer full access
to information on his assessment. It informs him of his appraisal value, his
assessed value, and their equivalent relationship. It attempts to educate the
taxpayer as to this relationship. The notice also informs the taxpayer of the
processes by which his assessment is determined. If he understands these
processes, he will know whether his assessment is fair relative to his neighbors
and others in the taxing jurisdiction.
1 3
6
In addition to imposing a statutory form on the method of taxpayer notifi-
cation, the above statute also concerns itself with the taxpayer's right of appeal
from an assessment. Although a thorough evaluation of the property tax ap-
peals process is beyond the scope of this article, the North Carolina appellate
184. GA. CODE ANN. § 91A-1435 (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
185. This statute is adopted from INTERGOVERNMENTAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 16. It
might be noted that subsections a-c are to some degree redundant. This, however, is necessary, we
believe, to assure that value is properly fixed.
186. 1d
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procedure in this area is also ripe for reform.' 8 7 Among the many reforms
that might be advanced in the area of the taxpayer's right of appeal, two theo-
retical suggestions are worthy of consideration as part of a general legislative
package. First, any taxpayer appeal should be made to an independent judi-
cial body that is not influenced by either the assessor or the taxing jurisdiction.
Since its tax base is directly affected, the taxing unit should not have the power
to appoint these referees. As a corollary, the assessor himself should not be a
member of this panel since he has a vested interest in defending the quality of
his work. Second, the taxpayer should not wholly carry the burden of proof.
The burden of proof should shift, as it does in a normal civil suit, once the
taxpayer establishes a prima facie case of improper assessment.
In addition to the two amendments to the appeals procedure outlined
above, a third procedure would aid the taxpayer on appeal and also assure the
maximum compliance with the assessment statute. A mandatory sales ratio
study on a periodic basis should be conducted by the state in each taxing juris-
diction to relate assessed value to sales prices. The study would reveal
whether the actual administration (assessment) of the property tax fulfills the
statutory mandate and treats taxpayers equitably. The state assessment ratios
would be admissible as evidence in any appeal of an assessment.188
Once the statutory structure for appraisal and assessment has been estab-
lished, the next question relates to the frequency of its use. North Carolina
law currently calls for an octennial reappraisal in each county; the appraisal
187. In revising the property tax law, North Carolina might consider adopting the current
scheme of assessment challenge operational in Oregon. The Oregon Legislature has set up the
Oregon Tax Court, a court of limited jurisdiction in tax matters. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 305.405-.575
(1979). In its enabling statute, the court is empowered to hear the complaints of taxpayers whose
property has been valued at less than $35,000. Id § 305.515(l)(b) The procedure in the Small
Claims Division is informal. The judge may hear any testimony he deems necessary or desirable,
and the taxpayer need not be represented by an attorney. Id § 305.545. Once the taxpayer elects
to proceed m the Small Claims Division, he loses his right of appeal; however, any judgment is
conclusive upon all parties, including the Department of Revenue. Id §§ 305.530, .555. The
predominant advantage of the Oregon system is in its distribution of the burden of proof. Rather
than a strict presumption in favor of the administrative agency, as in North Carolina, the Oregon
statute shifts the burden depending on the circumstances. Section 305.427 provides that "filn all
proceedings before the tax court and upon appeal therefrom, a preponderance of the evidence
shall suffice to sustain the burden of proof. The burden of proof shall fall upon the party seeking
affirmative relief and the burden of going forward with the evidence shall shift as m other civil
litigation." Id § 305.437. This statute was cited in J.R. Widmer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,
261 Or. 371, 494 P.2d 854 (1972), in which the court struck down the "presumption of assessment
validity". The court found the presumption still existed that an assessor performed his procedural
duty faithfully, but this presumption no longer extended to any valuation the assessor made of a
property. Id at 375, 494 P.2d at 856. In addition to the Small Claims Division, property tax cases
with assessments greater than $35,000 are processed in the regular division of the Tax Court. This
streamlined process for property tax cases (and other tax cases as well) should be considered in
any revision of the North Carolina property tax laws. At the very least, the Oregon experience
suggests that the simple shifting of the burden of proof is an effective way of doing equity in
property tax cases. See Schoettle, Review of Real Property Valuation in the Court, 4 INT'L PROP.
ASSESSMENT AD. 161, (1972); Phillips, The Oregon Tax Court: Some Thoughts on Its First Deci-
sions, 42 OR. L. REv. 292 (1963); Roberts, An Introduction to the Oregon Tax Court, 9 WILLI-
LAMETrE L.J. 193 (1973). A number of other states have established tax courts or special tax
tribunals, including Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan and New Jersey.




year is staggered from county to county. In addition to the octennial reap-
praisal, the statute also allows the county commissioners to impose a reap-
praisal during the fourth year following the appraisal.
The current North Carolina system of revaluation has drawn criticism
from a variety of sources. A number of North Carolina tax officials have as-
serted that annual revaluation would be the fairest method of revaluation be-
cause real property loses tax value in relation to the market value if not
revalued each year.'8 9 In addition to maintaining a fair tax value, frequent
revaluation of real estate is important to maintain equity between owners of
personal property and real property. According to Robert Heater, a Wake
county commissioner, "Roughly speaking, businesses are paying a fifty per-
cent higher rate than an individual (land owner) is right now, because of the
effects of an annual assessment of the personal property portion. . so the
person who has real estate is getting by lighter, and the person who has per-
sonal property is getting browbeaten."190 Finally, octennial revaluations have
been considered plainly archaic:
Back in horse-and-buggy days, tramping all over the county once
every eight years checking property values might have been a reason-
able way to keep the tax rate up to date. In the middle of the Twenti-
eth Century, however, an eight-year-old assessment is a relic, almost
a curiosity, like a Depression grocery ad featuring pork chops at a
dime a pound. It is no realistic basis for taxation and no way for a
government to support itself.191
It is clear that the larger metropolitan areas of North Carolina-the Tri-
angle, the Triad, and Mecklenburg County-need and probably can afford
annual 192 assessment. 193 However, it is equally clear that the smaller, rural
counties do not need and cannot afford an annual reassessment. Thus, a prac-
tical, and perhaps politically feasible, compromise would be biennial assess-
ments with optional annual assessments. In addition, a special provision
might allow a county to extend the biennial requirement two more years if a
sales ratio study shows a medium ratio of eighty-five percent and a coefficient
of dispersion of less than twelve. 194 This formula would allow frequent reval-
189. See Property Tax Shift Hits Homeowners, Raleigh News and Observer, Nov. 25, 1979, at
1, col. 1.
190. Siceluff, Tax Base Balance is Stressed, Raleigh News and Observer, Oct. 30, 1979, at 23,
col 2.
191. Editorial Value Update, Winston-Salem Sentinel (on file in N.C. L. Rev. office).
192. Annual assessment, however, is frequently misunderstood. Annual assessment im-
plies that: (1) the factors affecting market value (and therefore the factors used in an
appraisal) are consciously and continuously reevaluated and (2) when one or more of the
factors has changed, appraised values are recalculated to reflect the status of the market
as of the current year's appraisal date. Annual assessment does not require that all as-
sessments must be changed each year, but it does require that assessors have the capabil-
ity to change each assessment each year if a change is warranted. . . . Annual
assessment, therefore, is as much aprocess as it is an identifiable result of that process.
Property Tax Relief and Reform, ASSESSMENT DIG. 29, 29 (July/August 1979).
193. See Margin, Mecklenburg's System of Appraisal Unique, Winston-Salem Journal (article
details the computer model that Mecklenburg County adopted) (on fie in N.C.L. Rev. office).
194. These are optional numbers and have no legal significance. Eighty-five percent is used in
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uation when necessary and practicable, but would not force them in areas
where they are not needed.
Once the legislature has determined the appropriate timing for revalua-
tions, a second problem must be considered. In a time of rising prices and
inflation, a tax based on value rises automatically even absent a concomitant
increase in the wealth necessary to pay the tax. If a revaluation occurs annu-
ally or biennially in an inflationary economy, the appraisal will rise and the
tax will increase if the rate remains constant. A second, closely related prob-
lem will also occur any time a state adopts full value assessment following the
use of fractional assessment. An increase to full value will automatically in-
crease the tax bill if the rate remains constant.
The solution to both of the above problems is "roll-back" legislation.
Roll-back legislation automatically reduces the tax rate by the same percent-
age as property values increase. Thus, a $40,000 assessment at a one percent
rate would yield a tax of $400. If the true value of the house was $80,000, the
tax rate would be cut in half, to one-half percent, so that the tax yield would
remain at $400. Accordingly, the effective tax rate remains constant and the
assessment value would be increased without increasing taxes. 195
Once the North Carolina system has fully absorbed the impact of full
value assessment through roll-back legislation, the problem of inflationary tax
increases must be solved. If the statute requires annual or biennial assessment,
a hidden tax increase occurs without legislative mandate, and revenues are
increased without taxpayer scrutiny. To remedy this situation, a different type
of roll-back legislation is proposed. First, the new assessment is completed
and the total assessed value of the jurisdiction is computed. Then the value of
new buildings and improvements is subtracted from the total. A comparison
of the figure thus obtained to the whole of the previous year's sum will then
yield the percent of the property's increase due to inflation. This figure will
then be used to reduce the tax rate. An example of this would be as follows:
Suppose a town has an assessed valuation of $1,000,000 in 1981, and a tax rate
the first instance since this allows the 15% statutory deviation currently allowed. A coefficient of
12 was an arbitrary pick between 10 and 15, which is considered an acceptable range. Some
latitude must also be allowed for the fact that a sales-ratio study draws only from property sold,
and a property owner is more likely to sell speculative property that has increased in value faster
than surrounding property than he is to sell a residence or business that has not appreciated as
substantially or as quickly.
195. Of course, roll-back legislation following an adjustment to full value assessment is not as
simple as the above example would appear. Two statutes that enact roll-back legislation are re-
produced here to show the complexity of the problem:
Kentucky:
Act of Sept. 17, 1965, ch. 2, § 1, 1965 Ky. Acts, Ist Ex. Sess. 3 (amending KY. REv. STAT.
§ 132.020 (1942)); Act of Sept. 17, 1965, ch. 2, § 11(6), 1965 Ky. Acts, Ist Ex. Sess. 17 (amending
Ky. REv. STAT. § 132.010 (1942)).
Florida:
Act of June 13, 1973 ch. 73-172, § 13, 1973 Fla. Laws 331 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 200.065
(Supp. 1980)); Act of May 31, 1963, ch. 63-250, § 8, 1963 Fla. Laws 600 (formerly codified at FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 193.03) (repealed 1969).
Kentucky has had extraordinary success with its roll-back legislation. See text accompanying
notes 107 & 108 supra.
[Vol. 59
PROPERTY TAX REFORM
of one percent, yielding taxes of $10,000. In 1982, following the revaluation,
the town has a value of $2,500,000, $1,000,000 of which is attributable to infla-
tion and $500,000 of which is attributable to new construction. Thus, the new
base, following 100 percent inflation, is $2,000,000, twice the amount of the old
base. The tax rate would thus be reduced by a ratio of one-half ($1,000,000 -
$2,000,000), yielding a rate of one-half percent. This in turn would yield a tax
return of $10,000 on the old property, and $2,500 on the new construction.
1 96
The necessity for this type of roll-back legislation becomes clear when one
examines the pre-Proposition 13 sitaution in California. California had
adopted tremendously efficient assessment machinery that revalued property
annually. The effects of inflation and greater demands for owner-occupied
housing increased the value of property and land significantly in that state,
with residential assessments rising an average of twenty percent.197 While the
property assessments were increasing, local jurisdictions were failing to lower
the tax rates on property, 98 and surpluses developed; the state surplus was
approximately $6.1 billion.199 Taxpayers whose bills increased twenty-five to
fifty percent justifiably were angered at this failure of response by local gov-
ernment and rebelled. Unfortunately, their rebellion culminated in Proposi-
tion 13, a poorly drafted piece of stopgap legislation that is now part of the
California Constitution. To avoid a similar scenario in North Carolina, roll-
back legislation keyed to successive revalutions and inflation, as well as to the
initial reassessment yielding full value assessment, is a necessity.
Once the general system outlined above has been adopted, North Caro-
lina will have the basis for an effective and efficient property tax administra-
tion. Implementing ideas to make the system equitable and compassionate for
all citizens would make the above system truly "model." While an exhaustive
discussion of these topics is clearly beyond the scope of this article, a few ideas
are noteworthy.
The possibility of classification of property has been given limited expo-
sure up to this point. Classification is constitutionally permissible in North
Carolina, but has not been extensively imposed by the legislature. The au-
thors, like the legislature, would allow limited classification in the assessment
process for farm land and forests. They would also allow limited classifica-
tion for noncommercial recreational land. Further classification might be
made to include commercial property, homeowners, rental property, and the
like. Although the authors do not agree on the role of classification in prop-
erty tax administration, agreement extends to one principle-property should
be valued at full market value. Any classifications can be implemented either
as described above2°° or in the rate of tax imposed-not in the appraised
196. New construction and impjprovements are exempted from the base for two reasons: first,
they would distort the amount of inflationary increases and second, new construction would pre-
sumably create a larger demand for services which would not otherwise be accounted for.
197. Levy, On Understanding Proposition 13, 56 PUBLIC INTERrsT 66, 76 (Summer 1979).
198. Id at 75.
199. Id at 80.
200. See text accompanying notes 176-79 supra.
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value. A property should not be valued at seventy-five percent and then taxed
at the full rate. Rather, property should be valued at 100 percent and the rate
should be reduced by one-fourth. Although this may appear to be quibbling
over formulas that yield identical results, a classification system that maintains
the unity in the full value appraisal system is preferable.
In addition to developing an effective, fair, and accurate property tax sys-
tem, any new legislation in North Carolina also should develop an effective
and fair system of relief from property taxes for particular individuals. Since
property taxes are not computed relative to income, the most effective property
tax relief is tied to income. The most common form of income-related prop-
erty tax relief is the "property tax circuit breaker." A property tax circuit
breaker is a tax relief program that is designed to "protect family income from
a property tax overload in the same manner that an electrical circuit breaker
protects property from an electrical current overload. '201 Thus, under most
state systems, if the property tax exceeds a particular percentage of gross in-
come, the tax overload is broken by a form of tax relief--either a reduction in
the property tax itself, credit against the state income tax, or a cash rebate.
20 2
In addition to gearing the benefit to income, about twenty states also allow
relief for elderly homeowners. 20 3 A detailed circuit breaker statute is also
outside the scope of this article but is a necessity for any new scheme of fair
and effective property taxation. Without an effective circuit breaker, the sys-
tem once again will become overloaded by complaints of a tax so confiscatory
that it takes the bread off the table of poor and elderly homeowners.
204
In addition to the adoption of an income-related circuit breaker in the
property tax scheme, the legislature might consider implementing a variety of
other policies through the use of property tax credits, reductions, and exemp-
tions. Downtown revitalization projects might be induced through a reduction
on the rate of property taxes paid. New housing projects in formerly blighted
urban areas might also receive special tax treatments. In order to preserve
certain beach areas, property owners might be enticed by cash rebates. These
particular policies are not outside the scope of the property tax, but they must
be handled by the legislature in an equitable manner. In no case, however,
should property be appraised at less than full market value. If property is
201. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PROPERTY TAX CIRCUIT-
BREAKERS: CURRENT STATUS AND POLICY ISSUES 2 (1975).
202. Id
203. Id at 4.
204. See J. Clairborne, Alexander's Warning: Next Revaluation May Cause Properly Tax Re-
bellion Here, Charlotte Observer, July 7, 1979, at 14A, Col. 1 (quoting Robert P. Alexander,
retired Tax Supervisor, Mecklenburg County):
"I would guess that half the owner-occupied houses there are owned by widows and
elderly people, who have very little income. But in the last few years, that neighbor-
hood's become a very popular place to live, and property values there have probably
doubled and tripled. How are those widows and elderly people going to pay taxes on
property valued that high?
When taxes begin to take milk and bread off a family's table, they are confiscatory,
he said, "but that's what I see us getting into."
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valued at less than full value, the whole system of a roll-back will be distorted,
and citizens will not know the costs of these exemptions.
A final piece of legislation that would be informative to taxpayers, tax
administrators, and legislators alike, would be a statute that requires publica-
tion of information on the costs of exemption. Accurate appraisal of exempt
properties will indicate the cost of exemption to the public and allow more
rational, informative debates on the cost/benefit of the exemption.20 The
easiest statute to yield this result would read as follows:
It is the duty of the assessor to list, appraise and assess all real prop-
erty exempted from general property taxation. Such property shall
be listed separately on the tax rolls and shall not be included for
purposes of the roll-back statute. Such list shall be published with
the taxable list and properly filed in the taxing jurisdiction.
20 6
In the course of developing a model property tax scheme for North Caro-
lina, many different ideas and proposals were carefully weighed, primarily in
terms of fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness. However, a factor that was al-
ways considered at each stage of a proposal was "what is the economic cost of
this amendment and does the cost outweigh the benefit?" Although only esti-
mates are available for most of these costs in the North Carolina system, heavy
reliance was placed on the experience of other states. In each instance, in our
estimation, the social and economic benefits of any aspect of a change out-
weighed its costs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The North Carolina property tax system needs reform. This article pro-
poses a comprehensive scheme for that reform. The key to acceptable reform
lies in the concept of full value assessment-a system of assessment that is
simple, fair, and easy for any taxpayer to understand. Once full value assess-
ment has been adopted, corollary problems, particularly inflation, must be
considered. An effective roll-back statute, at the time of the first full value
assessment, and again at each revaluation, will temper the rages of inflation
and avoid a tax spiral such as that witnessed in California. Absent effective
roll-back legislation, any reform will be saddled with the spectre of inflation.
In addition to the problem of inflation, the needs of low income and elderly
205. It is a fundamental precept of democracy that an uninformed people is not a free people.
Thus the publication of this seemingly mundane information will be useful in having rational
decision-making in the property tax area.
206. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 39-3-105 (Cum. Supp. 1978):
39-3-105. Exempt property listed and valued. It is the duty of the assessor to list,
appraise, and value all real property exempted from general property taxation, pursuant
to the provisions of section 39-3-l01(l)(e) to (l)(g), and all other property otherwise ex-
empt but taxable under section 39-3-112 and the same shall be entered in the same detail
required of taxable property.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations states that 17 states enacted legislation
requiring local assessors to list and set values on exempt properties. These states include Califor-
nia, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and South Da-
kota. INTERGOVERNMENTAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 19.
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taxpayers must be considered. Any system that fails to adopt these reforms
eventually will be burdened again by taxpayer rebellion and unrest.
